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Abstract
The Displaced as Guest: A Case Study of the Yezidis of Iraq and Jacques Derrida’s
Deconstruction of Hospitality
Zachary Jackman
The American University in Cairo
Under the supervision of Dr. Ian Morrison
This thesis examines the Yezidi forced migration crisis by applying Jacques Derrida’s
deconstruction of the binary relationships of self and the other (ipseity) and host and guest
(hospitality). This approach first uncovers how the application of these categories operates in
the Yezidi dilemma. Further, deconstructing the classifications then creates a space for
thinking of alternative means of considering identity, foreignness, the hospitality exchange,
and competing discourses. With over half of the entire global Yezidi population still living as
hosted, forcibly displaced guests after three years, these new windows may provide a better
opportunity to critically engage with the emergency situation and its power relationships and
give a superior platform for considering durable solutions for the group, such as the prospect
of returning home.1

1

I am borrowing UNHCR’s terminology of “Durable Solutions,” which includes the four
core options of: “family reunification, local integration, resettlement, and voluntary
repatriation.” See: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Refugee
Protection and Durable Solutions in the Context of International Migration. Report. 2007.
UNHCR/DPC/2007/Doc. 02
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Introduction
Yezidis3 form a closed ethnic and religious minority group predominantly found in
Iraq. Their faith is heterodox to the majority and official state theology of Islam and is
markedly different, even from other minority faiths like Christianity, in its origin and oral
framework. Yezidis have ancient and traditional roots in the north of the country, particularly
in the mountains near the borders with Turkey, Syria, and Iran. They are believed to be
ethnically Kurdish yet majority power actors throughout their history have used their ethnic
and religious origins to both differentiate and distance them, but also to co-opt them when it
has been politically advantageous.
The fluctuations between Yezidis being distanced, named as foreign, and
appropriated, also progressively gave rise to violent persecution. As a result, Yezidis have
also attempted to physically and relationally separate and insulate themselves. Yezidis have
developed a lasting pattern of seeking refuge in the peaks and valleys that demarcate the edge
of the Nineveh Plains through the regimes of the Kurdish Tribal Emirs, the Ottomans, the
British Mandate, the Kingdom of Iraq, Ba’athist Iraq and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, the Coalition
Provisional Authority, and the current government.
However, starting on the third of August 2014, with an unprecedented level of
violence, the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) swept through the villages surrounding the lone
and frontier mountain range of Sinjar, one of the two main historical areas of Yezidi
concentration. Thousands from the community were trapped on the mountain itself that had
been trusted for generations and hundreds of thousands fled to neighboring Syria and the
Duhok Governorate in Kurdish Iraq. In the sudden assault over a quarter million Yezidis
were forcibly displaced over a period of two weeks.

3

Also commonly spelled Yazidi, Ezidi, or in the more antiquated forms Yezidee or Yezeedi
10

With the global Yezidi population only around 500,000, more than half of the entire
community has now remained as hosted displaced guests for over three years. Fifteen formal,
majority Yezidi camps are run by the federated Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
housing approximately 160,000 and more than 90,000 live in informal settlements outside the
camps.4 The KRG, in partnership with the United Nations and non-governmental
organizations, provides services like camp maintenance, water access, healthcare, distribution
of tents and non-food items, food, and cash assistance. In addition to internally displaced
Yezidis, around 360,000 Christians, Sunni and Shi’a Muslim Turkomen, Sunni Arabs, and
Sunni and Shi’a Muslim Kurds are also living displaced in the Duhok area, some of whom
are refugees from Syria.5
Operating in the capacity of a host and a master of the house, the KRG has received
international praise for its open doors, rapid construction of camps, wide-scale response, and
ongoing work with organizations like the UN. With Duhok Governorate alone hosting and
giving refuge to more than 600,000 of Iraq’s 4.2 million total displaced, the response to the
crisis has been, in many regards, an exemplary display of hospitality.6 However, in addition
to the unprecedented ethnic targeting of the group, the 2014 crisis also resulted in majority
power actors, like the KRG as host, exercising unprecedented degrees of full co-option.
Historical trends of naming and reducing Yezidis into binary categories culminated in a peak
of Kurdish inclusionism toward Yezidis and a referendum for Kurdish national independence.
The efforts resulted in the deployment and propagation of reductive understandings of
the Yezidi situation and reflect that the corresponding power relationships that both created

4

Duhok Governorate Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs (BRHA), Executive
Directorate. IDPs and Refugees in Duhok Governorate - Profile and General
Information. Report. February 2016.
5
Ibid
6
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). 2017 Humanitarian
Needs Overview: Iraq. Report. January 2017.
11

and perpetuate them are imbalanced. The resulting skewed relationship of hospitality leans
toward conditionality and, more importantly, contributes to protracting the crisis. Outside of a
highly prescribed and narrowly fixed rhetorical narrative of nationalistic “Kurdification,” the
quarter million displaced Yezidis who are still hosted in camps in the KRG after three years
face limited prospects toward durable solutions like returning home or even integrating.7
Applying Derrida’s deconstruction of hospitality, foreignness, and identity first
provides an opportunity to analyze the dichotomies and reductions within the crisis and
hospitality relationship that have given rise to current narratives. Second, his deconstructive
technique and theory of rather holding assumed binary oppositions (like host and guest, self
and other) in tension and antinomy, what he terms aporia,8 creates a platform for considering
alternative counter-discourses and beneficial ways of rethinking the dynamics of the
hospitality exchange and identity formation within it.
Both Derrida and his deconstruction have prompted a large body of theoretical
critiques and scholarly discussion (and their fair share of controversy), including in the field
of migration and refugee studies. However, less material applies and tests his ideas and
methods, particularly on hospitality, to specific migration crises, especially contemporary
crises. This thesis summarizes some of Derrida’s core theories in hospitality (and some of the
implications that other scholars have elaborated upon on a theoretical level) in order to apply
them to a case-study of the Yezidi emergency. The objective is to test whether Derrida’s
ideas provide a more helpful way of understanding the Yezidi crisis.

7

Barber, Matthew. "The KRG’s Relationship with the Yazidi Minority and the Future of the
Yazidis in Shingal." NRT, January 31, 2017.
8
Derrida, Jacques, and Anne Dufourmantelle. Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites
Jacques Derrida to Respond. Translated by Rachel Bowlby. Stanford University Press, 2000,
p. 65. Note: The text is formatted on corresponding pages where Dufourmantelle, on the lefthand, even-numbered pages provides a commentary (which she terms an “invitation”) to the
recorded proceedings of Derrida’s two seminars which appear on the right-hand, oddnumbered pages. References to Dufourmantelle’s commentary, as opposed to Derrida,
hereafter include the annotation Dufourmantelle - Invitation in the footnotes.
12

This thesis will incorporate the two-fold approach to analyzing rights disputes within
Derrida’s framework and concept of justice proposed, in part, by Kelly. First, it is necessary
to consider the “seriousness and weight” of the factors that lead to flight, particularly the
imperative of fleeing genocide.9 Second, the “power differentials” between the parties
disputing the rights need to be examined.10 However, Kelly cautions that it is also essential to
see that these differentials may have been “contaminated by the legacy of historical power
and wealth acquisitions resulting from colonialism, nationalism or imperialism” and that
simply providing “balance” may be inadequate and may actually instead perpetuate skewed
relationships of power.11
Further, while there is a relative lack of material that does apply Derrida to
contemporary migration issues, some examples do exist and form a backdrop for this present
thesis. Stronks, for instance, applies Derrida to a recent example of a Somali asylum seeker
named Abdirizak who arrives as the Dutch border.12 He traces Abdirizak’s journey from the
first “violence” of having his interview being conducted in the Dutch language, which was
foreign to him, and only being able to write his name in Somali, for example, through to
tension between subjective and “objective” memory and testimony. Importantly for the topic
here, however, he applies Derrida’s theories to a real and contemporary case of forced
migration and hospitality and argues effectively that Derrida’s ideas provide significant
explanatory power. For Stronks, the tension of the arrival at the border “is in fact
paradigmatic for hospitality and […] for our migration practice.”13 This thesis takes a similar

9

Kelly, Michaeleen. "A New Humanitarian Paradigm for Understanding the Right to
Asylum: Responses to Arendt and Derrida." The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance,
February 21, 2010.
10
Ibid
11
Ibid
12
Stronks, M. C. "The Question of Salah Sheekh: Derrida’s Hospitality and Migration Law."
International Journal of Law in Context 8, no. 1 (2012): 73-95, p. 74.
13
Ibid
13

approach to Stronks application, though it concentrates on analyzing history and rhetoric
rather than law and the scale focuses on a larger crisis rather than an individual case.
As is true for the Yezidis, the overall number of forcibly displaced people in the world
is at a record high and the assumed binaries, priorities, laws, and conditions within hospitality
have become a daily reality in the lives of more people than ever before.14 Forced migrants,
in particular, have also had hospitality imposed on them rather than entered into voluntarily.
For Yezidis, it is the current state of affairs for over half of the community’s entire global
population. Derrida equivocates hospitality to ethics, and building on language construction
(and deconstruction), he questions conditional expectations like the ones embodied in
Kurdification and the referendum, particularly in light of sharp increases in refugee crises
around the world that seem to coincide with the dominance of nation-state frameworks, an
anticipated end toward which the referendum explicitly aimed.15 Instead, Derrida’s
discussions of new alternative future concepts like cosmopolitan cities of refuge cast further
light on the imbalance within the current hospitality crisis. Further, they allow a window for
considering prospects for the Yezidi community’s future, the ability to integrate, and the
possibility of one day returning home.16

14

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Global Trends - Forced
Displacement in 2016. Report. 2017, p. 2. UNHCR reports that a record high 65.6 million
people have been affected by forced displacement, with 4.2 million being in Iraq alone. The
population of forcibly displaced persons, including Yezidis, in Iraq is the fourth highest in the
world, preceded only by Syria, Colombia, and Afghanistan, in that order, pp. 5 & 9.
15
Derrida, Of Hospitality, pp. 135-137, 147-151; Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and
Forgiveness. Routledge, 2001, pp. 16-17
16
Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Routledge, 2001, p. 4
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Chapter 1 - Yezidis as Foreigners / History, Naming, Violence, and Displacement
In the Greco-Roman tradition,
“The stranger who appeared with no hostile object was regarded in the light of a
suppliant and under the especial protection of Zeus Xenios. Hence he was kindly
received, and on his departure broke a die […] with the host, each keeping a half for
mutual recognition by themselves or by their descendants in future times. The ties of
hospitality thus formed were hereditary in families. At Rome a stranger (hospes) was
equally protected by custom and law, and the tessera hospitalis was equally a pledge
and a symbol of this relation of host and guest. A formal hospitality when once
declared could only be broken off in an equally formal way by a solemn
renuntiatio.”17
According to Derrida, the ancient concept of hospitality is fundamentally a paradox.18 He
shows this by exploring the relationships between binaries and seeming oppositions that
make up its elements. He observes, for example, that in order to even have the ability to host,
a master of a house must, in a most basic sense, have sovereignty and control over the distinct
space in which they can welcome others and provide shelter and care.19 To put it even more
simply, a guest can only come from outside the home. They must be separate, come through a
door, cross a threshold, a delineation, otherwise they would already be at home and it would
not be hospitality at all. However, at the same time that a master, father, lord, homeowner,
group, state, or so on establishes the limitations of their home, creating the possibility of
hospitality, they also inevitably, by the same action, exclude. Drawing borders, in every
possible sense of the concept, while creating a space for hospitality toward the foreigner,
other, or stranger involves the same act of differentiation that creates the foreigner.
Hospitality, which in its most abstract form is the total and unconditional welcome of the
stranger, is steeped in the simultaneous antinomy of exclusion, differentiation, and expulsion.

17

Peck, Harry Thurston. Harper's Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities. Harper
& Brothers, 1898. Entry for: Hospitium.
18
Derrida, Of Hospitality, pp. 65; 75-79
19
Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 55
15

For Derrida, the inherent paradoxes in hospitality are a particularly poignant and
timeless manifestation of deeper linguistic patterns where seeming oppositions and binaries
dominate. Throughout his career, he explored at length his theory that language and
philosophy oversimplify and construct dichotomies like host and guest, self and other, family
and foreigner.20 Derrida argues that the oppositions and inherent paradoxes within them go
unacknowledged, are misunderstood, and set up undue privileges. In response, he developed
his technique of deconstruction which aims to destabilize assumed privileges and instead hold
oppositions and antinomies in constant tension, the end result of which is a potentially more
helpful way of understanding the relationships between the elements.
In part because of Derrida’s background and upbringing, and in part because
hospitality is ubiquitously cross-cultural and cross-temporal, it became a uniquely intriguing
area of inquiry and possibility for critique. Derrida, who was born and grew up in French
colonial Algeria, was also ethnically Jewish. Derrida and contemporaries like Hélène Cixous
(who was also a Jewish, French Algerian) wrote with a context and background of having
lived in between spaces of being guests, hosts, masters, subjects, foreign, and family, and
were included and excluded at the same time by the varying sides and by equally varying
means ranging from language, to naming, to schooling. Both had challenges with not only
being named, but choosing their own names and classifications, with understanding their own
identities and belonging, and further with wrestling with the complexities and paradoxes of
binary reductions that did not fit the experiences of their own lives.
As one example, Judith Still describes how Derrida, despite being Jewish, did not
know his “mother tongue” of Hebrew, nor did he know Arabic, but instead relied upon the

20

Derrida, Jacques, Gayatri Spivak, and Judith Butler. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2016.
16

heavily Christian-influenced French language.21 However, Caputo also observes that French
was not totally Derrida’s either.22 Derrida himself asks the rhetorical question of how
language, “the so-called mother tongue, the language you carry with you, the one that also
carries us from birth to death” fits as “the home that never leaves us.”23 For him, it is a place
to which one can “always come back” and that it is both a “mobile home” that one carries
with them, but at the same time an “immobile home” as one never leaves it behind.24 And as
Still continues, “language here [for Derrida] is understood not purely linguistically, but as
ethos. It includes social class or background, and culture […]”25 Together, these reflect a
problem of tension for Derrida between home, hospitality, and language that shapes much of
his thinking. Derrida was in a position of a French colonialist hosted by the majority (and
majority Muslim) Algerian population. Yet, at the same time, Derrida was Jewish, and was a
minority guest of a larger French “home,” and would find himself at times excluded from
Algerian culture and identity as an occupier, from French culture and identity as a minority
Jew and colonialist pied noir, and from Jewish culture because he did not speak Hebrew.26
Yezidis, and especially displaced Yezidis from Sinjar, face a similar set of challenges
and relationships. The crisis and Yezidi culture both intersect at crossroads between identity
formation, language (both literal tongues and the wider ethos), nationalism, trauma, memory,
displacement, and an overarching hospitality exchange. Displaced Yezidis from Sinjar have
been named as foreigners, excluded, hosted, and co-opted. At the same time, elements that

21

Still, Derrida and Hospitality: Theory and Practice. Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p.
154; See also: Caputo, John D. "A Community without Truth: Derrida and the Impossible
Community." Research in Phenomenology 26, no. 1 (1996): 25-37, p. 32
22
Caputo, “A Community without Truth,” p. 32
23
Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 89
24
Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 89
25
Still, Derrida and Hospitality, pp. 29, 131
26
Pied noir, lit. ‘Black foot,’ was a pejorative term used to refer to “In France: a person of
European origin living in Algeria during the period of French rule, esp. a French person
repatriated after Algeria was granted independence in 1962.” See entry for Pied noir in
Oxford English Dictionary. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
17

contribute to forming identities, such as language and ideas of the home, leave them in spaces
like Derrida where binary reductions do not account for the realities of daily life. Sinjari
Yezidis, for example, who prefer Arabic, face challenges from their Kurdish hosts for the
“mother tongue,” in which they find comfort and which in some senses is a home, because it
represents another reductive binary opposition, that associated with Arabism and Iraq versus
a Kurdish nation. At the same time, the reality shows that Yezidis too find the “home” of
their own mother-tongue problematic, but privileging the opposite does not provide a pure
alternative. Instead, language, like the wider ethos and rhetoric of the entire crisis, needs to be
deconstructed and held in tension.
Both his upbringing and his philosophical explorations prompted Derrida to consider
hospitality and its inherent power relationships. He levies fundamental structural questions
that go to the heart of paradoxes between abstract, utopian, unconditional hospitality and
practical, conditional hospitality: do we ask or not ask of the guest?27 If we do, in what
language do we ask?28 And language is not strictly language in the literal sense, though that is
invariably also included.29 Language, for Derrida, encompasses rhetoric, and in hospitality,
how it manifests in the act of naming, or appellation, is critical.
Still quotes Derrida in Monolingualism of the Other, who says, “Mastery begins, as
we know, through the power of naming, of imposing and legitimating appellations” and
concludes that the act of naming “can be peculiarly acute in a situation of extreme inequality”
and cites the example of colonialism as one such case where appellation has been
significantly consequential.30 However, Still reserves that naming also opens up “the

27

Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 29
Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 131
29
Still, Derrida and Hospitality, p. 149
30
Derrida, Jacques. Monolingualism of the Other: Or, The Prosthesis of the Origin.
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possibility of these ‘objects’ [‘objects of knowledge; known subjects’] re-appropriating their
names with pride and establishing counter-discourses.”31 Cixous warned to “never treat the
power of the name the power of name-words lightly.”32 Like Derrida, she wrote in the
context of French colonial Algeria in which, for example, neighborhoods with “99% Arab”
populations were given French names like Clos-Salembier.33
But, for Derrida, naming is the first and inevitable act of violence that recalls the
wider aporias in hospitality.34 And naming in itself carries its own complexities and
paradoxes, which can also include the lack of naming and depersonalizing. For example, Still
discusses the use of the term ‘boy,’ which can be both pejorative and ‘infantilising,’ but also
a term of personal endearment.35 Moreover, the paradox of “not naming,” such as Yezidis
being implicitly excluded in special categories like being “People not of the Book,” or a faith
that does not follow a majority canonical scripture system effectively categorizes them as
heterodox and defined against a majority standard. They are named by not being named.
The foreigner, and Yezidis, represent, in physical form, a destabilizing enigma affront
to the foundation of hospitality. The foreigner, with their foreign language, is the result of a
history of naming and distancing and the foreigner embodies the question; The question of
the foreigner as a concept and the questions both levied by the foreigner and to the
foreigner.36 However, “the question de l’étranger (as objective genitive: ‘the question of the
foreigner’) makes the foreigner sound like a problem that ‘we’ legitimate hosts should inquire
into and debate, or seems to refer to the inhospitable interrogation of the stranger (for
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example the asylum seeker), asking them for identity papers or at least a convincing narrative
(of unspeakable suffering).”37
In the Yezidi crisis, a historical background of being differentiated contributed over
time to the onset of the present displacement. But the re-emergence of Yezidis at the
threshold, the wounded and pursued guests seeking shelter at the door to the home, revived
the fundamental questions of hospitality and the foreigner. And, the questions go back to how
Yezidism first started.
History, Narration, and Naming of Yezidis:
The way the stranger is conceptualized, conceiving the other as the stranger to
whom hospitality is due, already presumes some form of determination,
introducing ‘circles of conditionality such as the family, the nation, the State,
citizenship’38
Over the last 800 years, Yezidis were progressively defined as foreign and their
otherness was cemented. However, despite being consistently distanced, emerging and
persisting patterns also show Yezidis being regularly co-opted, appropriated, and reappropriated. Two major structural factors are both causal and contributive: Yezidis are
simultaneously an orally based ethno-cultural-religious community and have a history of
occupying minority, marginal, fringe, and heterodox spaces theologically, physically,
socially, relationally, and politically. Furthermore, Yezidis are a minority within a larger
Kurdish minority and are often sidelined and absorbed into other, “larger” affairs and
disciplines.
Yezidi oral mythic tradition syncretically traces the community’s origins back to
literally primordial narratives from ancient Persian Zoroastrianism to Adam to the Great
Flood, but several departures from both Biblical and Qur’anic orthodoxies are worth noting.
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As Stoyanov shows in a historical traveler’s copy of one of the Yezidi holy texts, the Meshef
Resh39 (‘Black Book’ or ‘Black Writing’),40 early cosmogony for the Yezidis has a creating
god bringing forth both the angel Azrael and the primal waters of the pre-formed world out of
a ‘White Pearl’ created from god’s own essence.41 Yezidis revere Azrael as Melek Tawus, the
‘Peacock Angel’ or ‘King Peacock,’ among seven angels,42 whom they believe is the primary
of three manifestations of the single creator deity, Xwade.43 The triad, in a similar fashion to
the Christian concept of the trinity, also includes two other persons, Sultan Yezid and Shaykh
‘Adi, with the latter being of particular historic and contemporary importance.44
Many Yezidis believe that Yezidism is both the original Kurdish religion before Islam
and that they are the original ethnic Kurds, arguing that they are set apart from other faiths
and races. However, the syncretic story of Melek Tawus and his identification with Satan is
even more consequential. For Yezidis, Xwade tested Melek Tawus by commanding him to
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bow and worship Adam, which Melek Tawus refused on the grounds that it was wrong to be
subservient to any created being. The story is similar to the Qur’anic depiction of the angel
Iblis (Satan), where the angel refuses God’s orders to bow to Adam and is punished for his
disobedience as an unbeliever. The Qur’an refers to the fallen Iblis, for example, as a
‘disbeliever’45 and a ‘Jinn,’46 or evil spirit, and the unresolved elements of the angel’s
punishment in the Yezidi accounts show some crossover similarities. Biblical accounts of
Satan being punished and cast out of heaven also reinforce this. Further, there is extensive
serpent symbolism in the Yezidi community as well. Ussher’s A Journey from London to
Persepolis in 1865 includes a full-color lithograph plate of a drawing of the principle Yezidi
temple in Lalish that shows a large black snake next to the main door to Shaykh ‘Adi’s tomb
(See Photograph 5) which is still visible when visiting the site today.47 Other Yezidi shrines
and temples include snakes and Yezidi religious leaders in the past were also known to
perform rites while draping large, live black snakes over their shoulders. Another syncretic
story that appears also includes that the black snake was involved in the Yezidi version of the
Great Flood narrative, where the black snake saved Noah’s ark by plugging a leak with its
body (See Photograph 6).
Most importantly, the factors of syncretic stories employing the name Satan, strong
crossover symbolic and color imagery, secretive and changing accounts, and even deception
have together contributed to widespread beliefs and perceptions that, instead of being only
slightly heterodox, Yezidis are extremely foreign ‘Devil-worshippers.’ This led to two major
elements coinciding with naming in the early history of Yezidism; distancing and violence.
The faith first started with orthodox Islam and then split, gradually absorbing elements of
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other, older faiths as it became more and more fringe. At the same time, the group was
increasingly persecuted and marginalized for its heterodox position and increasingly resistant
to authority, such as spurning conscription efforts, which reinforced and exacerbated its
difference.
However, at the same time that Yezidis co-opted personal figures, narrative, and
physical spaces and became more distinct, the syncretic nature of their history also allowed a
two-way bridge over which other power brokers have since been able to do the same with
their own motives and agendas. As Yezidis became more foreign, both the communities and
the original masters of the house from which they deviated, the original family (or families),
simultaneously engaged in narrative construction and drawing borders from their own
perspectives.
Many Yezidis believe the oral tradition that copies of the Meshef Resh document, that
the venerated Shaykh ‘Adi was sent directly by god from the land of Syria to Lalish.48 For
Yezidis, Shaykh ‘Adi, being one of the three members of the Yezidi trinity, is himself an
image of the deity and, in accordance with mythic tradition, was responsible in part for
creating the Yezidis as a distinct and separate race.49 However, a different narrative from
several sources is widely accepted in scholarship and shows a heavily disputed and
appropriated figure. ‘Adi ibn Musāfir was historically a mystic Sufi with a distinctly Islamic
father and was born in Lebanon circa AD 1075.50 He was originally a strict follower of
orthodox Islam and his Sufi traditions were all notably written in Arabic.51 Despite being
influenced by trips to Baghdad in his youth, he retreated to the valley of Lalish, at the base of
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the Hakkari mountains on the edge of the Nineveh plains, sometime around AD 1100 and
lived there, apart from a trip to Mecca in 1116, for the rest of his life.52
As he gained followers and became the leader of a burgeoning religious community in
the secluded foothill sanctuary, he was bestowed with the title of “Shaykh” and his followers
became known as “‘adawys.” Açikyildiz notes that, “On their arrival [to Lalish], the ‘adawis
found a peasant community, whose beliefs may have been a mixture of ancient Iranian
beliefs, such as Zoroastrianism, and veneration for Yazid ibn Mu’āwiya, and who were in
need of a savior.”53 Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiya was a caliph in the Arab Umayyad dynasty, his
succession was particularly disputed by Muslims, and he became infamous for murdering
Hussein ibn ‘Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, and leader of Shi’a Islam. As
veneration for him was absorbed, some argue that he became a patronym for the transition of
the group from ‘Adawys to Yezidis, but the development is unclear. However, what is clear is
that association with ibn Mu‘āwiya became a major platform for both syncretism and cooption, leading at first to accusations against the Yezidis of Islamic roots and then later
apostasy, but curiously, the same argument of Yezidi ties to the caliph would later be used for
inclusion54 by Ṣaddām Ḥusayn’s Ba’ath regime during its Arabization campaigns to claim
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and co-opt Yezidis as being of Arab roots.55 Meanwhile, Shi’a Muslims emphasized that ibn
Mu‘āwiya was the murderer of ibn ‘Ali and treat the Yezidis with contempt.
At the time, ‘Adi and his followers had not yet totally departed from Islam. Guest
writes that, still “In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Islamic commentators mentioned
Shaykh Adi’s teachings with approval. They were unaware of two other works, attributed to
the shaykh […] that constitute the holiest book of the Yezidi religion and the principal psalm
of its devotees.”56 Shaykh ‘Adi would later be retroactively distanced by Islamic leaders for
his increasingly heterodox positions, especially when it was discovered that he authored
severely heretical works effectively used as scriptures, but Yezidism would not become a
clearly distinct religion until the 1400s.57
In addition to theological change, other early transitions also altered the course of
history for the community over the next millennia. At a point in history, Guest observes that
Shaykh ‘Adi changed from being referred to as al-Shamy (the Syrian) to al-Hakkari (the man
from Hakkari), of the Hakkari mountains that formed the Lalish valley near Duhok.58 This is
an early hint of a later essential shift from being identified as a Lebanese or Syrian Arab to
identification of both the person of Shaykh ‘Adi and Yezidis as a group as Kurdish.
Combined with the Yezidi mythic tradition of ‘Adi’ and the community’s ethnic singularity
and distinction, ‘Adi’s ethnicity still remains a significant polemical challenge as it has been
contended and co-opted by Kurds, Yezidis, and Arabs alike.
After several early successors, the ‘Adawy order was mostly comprised of Kurds, but
still notably Muslim.59 They became soldiers for another influential and regularly co-opted
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ethnically Kurdish Muslim, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, fighting in his armies in Egypt and Syria.60 At one
point, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn tried to sack Mosul but could not. And, because of fears of growing
Kurdish threat, Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, who was first regent, then later the post-Zangid Nur alDīn’s replacement atabeg ruling Mosul and the Jazīrah,61 had Shaykh Hasan, an early Yezidi
leader, “seized, imprisoned and strangled in the citadel of Mosul in 1246.”62
Lu’lu’ continued his campaign of violence. Guest cites a contemporary historical
source that: “after a bitter struggle, the Adawi Kurds were routed, some killed, others taken
prisoner. Lu’lu’ crucified a hundred and executed a hundred more. He ordered their emir’s
arms and legs to be chopped off and displayed above the gates of Mosul. He also sent men to
dig up Sheikh Adi’s bones and burn them.”63 Unsurprisingly, Fuccaro calculates that, “It is
most likely that the first groups of Yazidi refugees left Shaykhan for Jabal Sinjar64 in this
period […]”65 The Mountain, which was in an even more fringe and autonomous position
than the Lalish valley, first became known as a sanctuary and refuge, a namesake which over
750 years later it would both astoundingly fulfill and catastrophically betray.
Instead of political motivations, Yezidis became increasingly and even more violently
targeted by Sunni Muslims and even governments specifically for their cemented religious
heterodoxy and heresy. At the same time, the shift included reappearances of early
accusations and identities, such as Yezidis worshipping the ruler Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiya, to
justify religious persecution.66
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The Ottomans also heralded a key change in formalizing and legalizing the Yezidi
marginal position. Their religious policies encouraged Muslim Kurds (Sunni and Shi’a) to
persecute heterodox minorities like Yezidis.67 As Açikyildiz highlights, Yezidis, who were
not from mainline faiths, were also undefinable and “placed on the lowest rung of Ottoman
society.”68 For example, Yezidis were unable to avoid compulsory military service by paying
a tax because the legal mechanism for exception was only available to “People of the
Book.”69 Yezidi heterodoxy and fringe positioning was to such a degree that even
mechanisms for exclusion did not exist.
Sunni Kurdish religious and political power also started to be used toward Kurdish
nationalism.70 Key families, like the Barzans in northern Iraq (who were notably religious
and political), started to gain power as their shaykhs notably sheltered and hosted persecuted
members of other tribes.71 The Yezidis also sheltered refugees and as the Turks targeted
minority faiths like Christians in the Jazīrah, leaders like the Yezidi Hamu Shiru welcomed
them to Sinjar as asylum seekers. Shiru refused demands to turn over the refugees and, in
response, the Ottomans sent what would be their last expedition against the Mountain in
1918.72
Other key Ottoman changes paired with specific Yezidi practices further solidified
Yezidi fringing. In 1858, the Ottoman Land Code that was introduced as a part of the
Tanzimat reform period led to many Yezidis, who were traditionally farmers or shepherds,
and who were already mistrusting of the government, having their land registered from under
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them to others, notably Arab Muslim and Christian trading classes from Mosul. The issuance
of land deeds (Turkish: tapu, Arabic: tabu) started a systemic pattern of advantaging nonYezidis, even from other minority religions, that would continue through Ṣaddām’s
Arabization and have lasting effects. Yezidis were wary of land registration in part because of
historical practices from within the community prohibiting literacy, but more importantly,
because they saw it as the mechanism under which they would eventually be conscripted into
the army.73 As a result, at the turn of the century, in Sinjar, Muslims dominated the ownership
not only of businesses and public services, but houses as well.74
Yezidi leaders, like Hamu Shiru, were more welcoming to the British than Sunni
Kurds, who had been closer to the Ottomans, and in the beginning of the Mandate enjoyed
special relationships. For example, in exchange for allegiance and order, Shiru was set up by
the British as the chief of Sinjar and was given a “substantial monthly subsidy.”75 Combined
with similar Ottoman patters, these early trends of external support and being placed on
government payrolls, in a type of paternal dependence network, foreshadowed strategies that
continued through Ṣaddām and the Kurds. However, Yezidi practices like prohibitions on
literacy also continued to place barriers from within the group on its integration, and resulted
in the British choosing Christians to fill administrative posts instead.76
In the beginning of the 20th century, as the Kingdom of Iraq was formed, early
Kurdish nationalism also did not appeal to Yezidis because Kurds were largely Muslim.77
Additionally, the key Yezidi strongholds of Shaykhan and Sinjar were originally left out of
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nationalist dialogue. According to Açikyildiz, “It was only in the 1960s that Kurdish
nationalists realised the importance of obtaining the support of the Yezidis.”78
The turn of the century also saw Western European, mainly British, travelers and
archaeologists undertaking far trekked desert journeys to see the ancient, mysterious, illusory,
“primitive and superstitious”79 Yezidi “devil worshippers”80 in the frontier mountains of
Sinjar and Shaykhan. They watched the “cult” perform religious rites and dances in the
mystical Lalish valley temple and made drawings of their exotic experiences to be published
once home in geographical journals and travel volumes.81 (See Photographs 1-5). Key figures
like Gertrude Bell and Mark Sykes, who would influence the shaping of the borders, also
visited the area, with Bell photographing Lalish in 1909.82
Further, because of a lack of other written material, especially from within Yezidi
culture and its immediate setting, travel accounts and their agendas formed a part of the early
foundation of the written record about Yezidism. Moreover, they represented an
encompassing external, even paternal colonial framework and narrative that persisted in not
only drawing borders, but furthering the rhetoric and pattern of dependency and exclusion.
However, the historical patterns and the range of Yezidi heterodox practices that
distance them from power actors around them have not stopped efforts to absorb the group
when it has become politically expedient nor has it totally prevented the community from
being more widely politically absorbed. This is especially so when the balance between
political and religious power shifts toward the former. In periods when the Yezidis
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represented a means to a political end, a pattern of downplaying or outright ignoring their
relatively extreme theological positions in favor of, for example, their ethnic appropriability
surfaces. This is, in part, due to their geospatial position in key disputed areas, and their
mutually marginalized position in a no-man’s land between both Kurds and Arabs on other
fronts not constrained to the physical. The nature of Yezidi power and leadership structures
and the insular and endogamous group makeup has also largely resulted in a community that
is, apart from language, in many other regards homogeneous and, therefore, easily able to be
targeted and directed. Finally, while it is possible to overstate, the Yezidis, after hundreds of
years of repeated persecution and marginalization, are simply extremely vulnerable to
exploitation.
The Kurdish Autonomous Region formed in the 1970s was unstable. It included
Arbīl, Duhok, and Sulaymāniyyah Governorates, but also disputed territories and set the
groundwork for a bitter struggle between Baghdad and Arbīl that has never since stopped
(See Appendix: Maps).83 Under the 1970 Autonomy Agreement, Kurdish became the
language of instruction in schools in majority Kurdish areas. However, a large portion of
Yezidis were not affected because they resided in territory dominated by the central Iraqi
government and which had been the target of heavy Arabization. In Sinjar, teaching in
Kurdish was prohibited. “The government also refused to register newborns with Kurdish or
other non-Arabic ethnic names – claiming that “foreign names” are alien to the heritage of
Iraqi society and Islamic culture.”84
In the Ṣaddām era, Yezidis faced different manifestations of largely the same historic
phenomena. However, instead of being primarily religiously focused, as had happened with
the Ottomans, the policies of the Ba’ath government were driven by power consolidation on a
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basis of rising ethno-nationalist platforms. Yezidis were included as the Ba’ath regime more
widely targeted Kurds, which contributed to associating and reducing the sect to the binary of
Kurdish versus Arab (and Iraqi) inclusion. One of the most consequential and lasting results
of which was the Arabization and collectivization campaigns embarked by Ṣaddām’s regime
in the mid 1960s, mid 1970s, and late 1980s.
The Algiers Accord in 1975, which ratified the disputed borders between Iran and
Iraq, prompted the central Iraqi government to boost Arab populations among the Kurdish
frontiers, especially with Iran, like the mountains that form the boundary between the two
conflicting nations. The government relocated ethnic Arabs from southern Iraq to towns and
villages with predominantly Kurdish and Yezidi communities in the north and gave them
homes, land, and allowances. Additionally, they simply destroyed thousands of Kurdish
villages, including 400 Yezidi villages,85 and their mausoleums.86 In Sinjar district alone, the
government razed nearly 6,000 homes and displaced “hundreds of thousands” of Yezidis.87 It
moved the forced migrants to newly constructed collective villages (Arabic: mujamma’at)
with new Arabic names,88 and gave them a small allowance to rebuild, but like problems with
Ottoman tapu distribution, the regime denied Yezidis the right to register the new properties
in their names.89 Further, in censuses, Yezidis were forced to register as Arabs.90 It is also
worth noting that a secondary consequence of the campaign was the use of low-grade
construction materials for the new state-sponsored housing, which enabled ISIS in 2014 to
easily knock down thousands of homes and entire towns and added to the level of destruction
inflicted by airstrikes and mortars. The severity of the devastation still contributes to a lack of
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returns as many Yezidis, despite living in tents, would have to start with nothing if they chose
to go back.
Among many significant changes, collectivization also reinforced earlier patterns of
paternal dependence on the government for housing and daily subsistence, including food
rations.91 The collective towns were also civilly engineered with wider streets and straighter,
paved highways which enabled easier access for the central army, troop transports, and tanks,
making it easier to police, control, and master the concentrated and hosted population.
Yezidis, who were largely undereducated farmers and shepherds, now living in collective
urban environments, were not able to adapt agricultural skills or their education to new work,
which combined with majority orthodox attitudes toward their heterodoxy, even among other
forcibly relocated Kurds, further relegated them to both consistent poverty and dependence.
Collectivization and Arabization also de-cultured land relations that had long dominated
Yezidi social and economic practices, undermining mythic and experiential history, memory,
and ties to ancient concepts, like the mythical Mountain. Arabization and collectivization
were not only attempts to redefine the geospatial threshold of homes, belonging, and mastery
of the house, but also an effort to shift identity and dependence relationships to the paternal
state and to reconstruct memory.
At the same time, the Ba’ath government also completed massive civil works projects
like the Mosul dam which was constructed between 1980 and 1985 on the Tigris river,
creating Lake Ṣaddām (which would later be renamed Lake Mosul).92 Yezidis who lived in
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the villages along the river were pushed into the mujamma’at, like the Yezidi village of
Khanke (now in the KR-I), as their original towns were flooded by the new reservoir (See
Photograph 32).
As Yezidis were again reduced to some of the lowest rungs in society, Ṣaddām’s
Ba’ath regime nevertheless did not miss the opportunity to co-opt and revived the association
of Yezidis with the Caliph Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiya, claiming that they were Arab descendants.93
Few Yezidis supported the assertion and instead insisted on Kurdishness, but that
identification would also prove to be problematic.94 Despite crude attempts to co-opt Yezidis
as Arab, between 1986 and 1989 some Yezidis were swept under the umbrella of Ṣaddām’s
Anfal campaign which targeted Kurds.95 However, after the Anfal campaign and 1991 Persian
Gulf War, a coalition established two no-fly zones in Iraq, with one north of the 36th parallel,
which is 30km south of Sinjar Mountain.96 Further, in the aftermath of the war, Kurds seized
the opportunity to gain defacto autonomy from Baghdad, but disputed areas like Sinjar
remained outside that threshold. Only the religious Lalish valley and tomb of Shaykh ‘Adi,
the town of Ba’adre, and collective towns in Khanke, Mam Shivan, and Shāria were in the
Kurdistan Region. It is worth noting that all of these villages now host major Yezidi IDP
camps. The Yezidi towns of Shaykhan (‘Ain Sifny), Ba’ashīqah, and Sinjar were all outside,
leaving a supermajority of Yezidis still under central Iraqi administration.
With Kurdish autonomy, Yezidis in the region found new opportunity for increased
civic engagement, but from the start, clear agendas for “Kurdification” and early hints at
Kurdish ethno-nationalism hemmed development.97 Both the majority and opposition
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Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, supported Yezidi inclusion in the new Kurdistan, but
did so with specific interests, part of which involved promoting a narrative of Yezidis as the
original Kurds and Yezidism being the original, pre-Islamic Kurdish religion.98 The
willingness to absorb and appeal to Yezidism, despite its severe heterodoxy to Sunni Islam,
reflected a Kurdish shift away from religious centrism toward ethnocentrism that generally
paralleled the rise in political nationalism, which was fueled by and pitted against a growing
conflation of Islam and Arabism. Ṣaddām’s Arabization and collectivization and the Anfal
campaign had contributed to galvanizing Kurdish ethnic primacy.
In the early 1990s, new Kurdish television and satellite channels (closely tied to the
ruling parties) appeared alongside coalescing nationalism and helped to solidify a narrative of
Kurdishness. They built a rhetoric of Kurdish memory and nostalgia for the mountains and
the lost village life and broadcast traditional oral poems, dances, dress, and showed cultural
programs. Allison observes that urban Kurds who were interviewed “recalled their youth in
villages with fondness; this was not mere nostalgia, forgetting the harshness of the conditions
of rural life, but rather the result of a feeling, expressed by Kurds of all classes in Iraqi
Kurdistan, that the authentic Kurdish life was village life, and that the villages were the
repository of Kurdish culture.”99 The destruction of villages under Ṣaddām’s collectivization
and Arabization also created a blank canvas for reconstructing memory and the early Kurdish
movements co-opted it quickly, attempting to appeal to a universal and united Kurdish
experience, which by this time notably included Yezidis. The birth of Kurdish media
alongside culminating nationalism and heavy ties of government dependence also set up a
reaffirming relationship between the media, the government, and the Kurdish cause.
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However, myths of Kurdish unity were spurious at best and redactive, especially in
the Kurdish media. In 1994 civil war erupted between the two major Kurdish political parties,
the PDK, headed by Masoud Barzani (of the Barzani family of Shaykhs who had gained
support sheltering and hosting persecuted Kurds in the 1800s and 1900s), and the PUK, led
by Jalal Talabani. In 1996 the parties disputed over taxing illegal oil exports that the central
Iraqi regime had been allowed to funnel through Kurdish territory. The PDK, which
controlled borders to Turkey, was able to impose “tariffs” on oil exported to the country,
although it did so in the face of specific sanctions against Iraq.100 The PUK-dominated
territory near Sulaymāniyyah did not have the same opportunity because it simply only
borders Iran. The money, which an article cites at about half a million US Dollars a day at the
time, went in to PDK coffers.101 The government then used the funds to build infrastructure,
but also to create a heavy dependence and hospitality network with high rates of state payroll
(on the reciprocal condition of party loyalty).
Despite rhetoric of a united Kurdish brotherhood, key power actors were not averse to
bridging ethnic divides when it worked in their favor. In 1996, Barzani directly requested the
assistance of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn who then sent heavy armor and tens of thousands of Iraqi
troops to the PUK-controlled city of Arbīl to fight the Kurds that rivaled Barzani.102 After the
PUK was driven out, the PDK gained control and Ṣaddām’s forces withdrew back to Iraqi
territory. As Kurds battled Kurds, even with the help of Arab armies, Chapman contributes
that the war came to be called the “Shari bra Kuzhi, the “fight of brother killing” or as more
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commonly translated, “the brotherhood fight,”103 but it did not hinder efforts toward familial
inclusion of Yezidis, where it was expedient.
Meanwhile, as the PDK solidified its own base, it also continued efforts to bring
Yezidis under its particular Kurdish umbrella. In Duhok City in 1993, heavy party support
enabled the creation of the first Lalish Cultural Center.104 The centers are physical facilities
constructed in areas with concentrated Yezidi populations and are used for meetings,
funerals, and other public events. But the centers are not simply efforts from within the
Yezidi community to promote cultural or religious heritage, as their name may seem to
imply. Instead, they are created and funded with PDK financial backing and serve as a
platform for physical presence and hosting and they produce publications. The workers and
even Yezidi religious men involved in running the centers are on the PDK payroll and many
are party members (Much like Hamu Shiru was with the British in Sinjar at the turn of the
century and Yezidi forced converts were in Shaykhan in the 1890s when they were made
Ottoman Pashas).105 In the mid 2000s, new branches opened even in disputed areas like
Sinjar City, Snuny, Ba’ashīqah, and Shaykhan, Kurdish-controlled villages in Khanke,
Shāria, and Ba’adre, and more were planned.106 Moreover, the last four towns are now
locations of major IDP camps from the 2014 crisis and the centers in them are often used as
distribution locations by the government, charities, and NGOs for food and non-food items
for Yezidi IDPs. The government uses the centers, among other means, to create a visible and
associative pattern of hosting and providing for Yezidi citizens and Yezidi IDPs in disputed

103

Chapman, Dennis. Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Mazda
Publishers, 2011, p. 111
104
Açikyildiz, The Yezidis, p. 61; Dulz lists that it was founded in 1992. See: Dulz, et al.
“Persecuted and Co-opted,” p. 39
105
Maisel, “Social Change Amidst Terror and Discrimination,” p. 5.
106
Dulz, et al. "Persecuted and Co-opted,” p. 39
36

areas, camps, and PDK-controlled territory, but it is party-driven and the hospitality comes
with implicit conditional expectations.
While Kurds were also well familiar with persecution, the plight of being refugees,
and with being subjects of co-opting relationships of hospitality driven by Ṣaddām’s Iraqi
government, a new class of rulers and political elites emerged in tandem with increasing
control and ethno-nationalism. They had access to oil revenue and started to use it to build a
foundation toward changing the thresholds of the as yet delineated ‘Kurdistan.’ They started
to redefine the narrative of defending and promoting the new geopolitical homeland. In 1998,
the PDK opened a new military training facility in the city of Zakho. One of the cadets told a
Washington Post reporter, "I have joined to serve my country, to defend Kurdistan," but the
commander of the base, from Duhok, in a comically diplomatic attempt to salvage the
statement, interjected that, "Kurdistan is a part of Iraq, and our activities here have nothing to
do with seeking independence. Look: We are wearing Iraqi uniforms,” pointing to the Iraqi
crest with the eagle of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn emblazoned on his belt buckle.107
The rhetorical strategy also ironically started to involve similar elements that previous
majority actors, like the Ba’aths, had used, and even included hints of strategies that crossed
over with colonialism. With a wider view toward language, Still offers, for example, that “In
the colonial situation, the ‘first trick’ is that of the colonizer who imposes a language as ‘his
own’ – which of course it is not, but: ‘that is his belief; he wishes to make others share it
through the use of force or cunning; he wants to make others believe it, as they do a miracle,
through rhetoric, the school, or the army.’”108 As has already been discussed, Derrida’s idea
of language encompasses ethos and extends well beyond a literal tongue.109
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In September 1998, the Washington Agreement was brokered between rival PDK and
PUK factions, in part over oil-revenue disputes, but it was tense. McDowall concludes that it
was only the “imminence of a US invasion” which pushed the two parties to work together
toward a unified Kurdish cause.110 Despite emergent rhetoric toward a united and stable
‘Kurdistan’ under one roof, many Kurds were still divided, but the collective suffering and
targeting that they had endured would enable anti-Iraqi and other binary sentiments to gain
strong footholds, even if those promoting them had become distant to the daily reality of
poverty and persecution.
The ruling Kurds used Yezidi disenchantment with the central Iraqi government and
its policies to push the group toward greater Kurdish inclusion, but at the same time was also
not above employing similar methodology to that which had been used to co-opt and control
them before. The Kurdish region provided, generally, a more welcoming environment, both
ethnically and religiously, than the Yezidis had previously enjoyed. Maisel observes, for
example, that “until 1991, the Iraqi government outlawed Yezidi schools but, short of
Kurdish allies, relented after the Gulf War,” but continues that still in 1997 “two Yezidi
teachers from al-Qush were arrested by Ṣaddām’s intelligence services and tortured until they
agreed to stop teaching the Yezidi religion.”111 On the other hand, according to Dulz, in the
KRG system, if a class enrolls at least 20 Yezidi children, then Yezidi religious education is
taught as a subject twice a week.112
However, despite the spearhead of ethno-nationalism providing a greater window for
Yezidi religious inclusion in the face of heterodoxy, other aspects have remained more
contentious and resist appropriation. Moreover, the way the KRG handles them discloses that
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the underlying agenda is not primarily pro-Yezidi, but rather that Yezidis are a means to
another end; namely a wider Kurdish nationalism. Language, in particular, is a crux.
Controlling language (and the teaching and dissemination of that language) enables
the ability to control naming, narration, myth-making, and is in itself a move of power over a
personal and communal place of comfort, the ‘home’ of the mother-tongue, as Derrida says,
and each of these historical realities contributed to Yezidis developing a largely oral
culture.113 Allison observes that, “in the authoritarian states in the Near and Middle East,
where written material is rigorously censored, points of view which contradict the
government are usually by necessity expressed orally” and further that “Oral communication
is often the vehicle of minority discourses, of tendencies deemed to be subversive; oral
tradition, with its hallowed accounts of the people’s past, provides a whole fund of folkloric
examples which can be used to justify political courses of action, to rouse a rabble, or to fuel
a revolution.”114
From early history, Yezidis embraced strategies that counteracted patterns of cooption and made attempts to dissuade persecution, but the group nevertheless remained
vulnerable. Rich with maternal and home imagery, Derrida’s questions of language are
significant for forcibly displaced Yezidis, but only because of roots that took hold long before
the 2014 crisis. Early divisions between the two Yezidi spheres of influence in Sinjar and
Shaykhan dating back to the Kurdish tribal emirates created a pattern of Yezidis living in
disputed territories that not only included geophysical borders, but linguistic frontiers as well.
Generally, Sinjar, which came to be governed by Arabs in Baghdad and Mosul, and which is
legally in the Nineveh Governorate, (See Appendix: Maps) fell under heavy Arabic influence,
while Shaykhan, also technically in Nineveh, but because of its proximity to Duhok and other
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Kurdish cities, solidified Kurmanji and Sorani Kurdish. Moreover, the two language families
are not on equal footing.
While most Yezidis in both major regions speak Kurmanji Kurdish as a mothertongue, Kurmanji has several structural challenges that contribute to wider divisions and
setbacks among Yezidis, particularly those forcibly displaced from the Sinjar area. First,
Kurmanji is a significantly underdeveloped language that lags behind Sorani and even more
so, Arabic. Sorani became enshrined as the language of government in Kurdish Iraq when the
League of Nations delegated the Mosul vilayet.115 Kurmanji, on the other hand, never
received such a blessing. In neighboring Turkey (where Kurmanji is more regionally
common), the language was even illegal for official purposes between 1924 and 1991 and
since 1924 still remains prohibited for use in education, as it also came to be in Arab Iraq.116
Moreover, publication in Turkey in Kurmanji was almost nonexistent which created a major
dearth in literary material, and thus linguistic development, the consequences of which both
compounded over time and spilled over the border.117 Together, the development of the
language suffered and it became relegated to “a household language only,” while Sorani
enjoyed at least some development in government, administration, and publishing in the Iraqi
KRG.118
This was further exacerbated by the fact that in Iraq and Iran slightly altered Arabicbased scripts are used for reading and writing Kurdish, while Kurmanji in Turkey has
adopted a similar Latin-based alphabet to modern Turkish. Material that has more recently
begun to be published in Kurmanji in Turkey is largely illegible to Iraqi Yezidis. Again
because of cultural restrictions, few Yezidis in the past learned how to read or write and even
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fewer are literate in Kurmanji (and very little material is available anyway). Instead, Yezidis
in Shaykhan and other areas increasingly dominated by Kurds opted to learn Sorani while
Yezidis in Sinjar and even Ba’ashīqah, which is much closer to Mosul, learned Arabic.
For Sinjari Yezidis, now forcibly displaced in a Kurdish context, the lack of linguistic
Kurdish development severely handicaps their potential for integration and assimilation.
Moreover, their familiarity and comfort with Arabic is a point of contention and active
suppression among nationalist Kurds as it, especially since the 2014 crisis, has become
increasingly taboo and associated with Arabism, Islamism, and Iraq.
Further, recently (from as late as the 1950s) literacy is changing the reconstruction of
mythmaking and memory among Yezidis, who were historically oral. However, for Sinjaris,
that literacy is in the form of Arabic and Kurdish resistance to the language also constitutes
resistance to Yezidi abilities to construct collective memory since the 2014 crisis.119 This is
potentially dangerous as nationalism, narrative, ethnicity, and the textual galvanization of
traditionally oral myth and memory are all crossing at the same temporal juncture as forced
migration, war, and Kurdish, Iraqi, and Islamic nationalism. While it would come to a head in
the 2014 crisis and the Kurdish independence referendum, contention over language in
disputed territories nevertheless gained roots along with Kurdish ethno-nationalism decades
before. Further, the pattern of how it has been handled is a good litmus test and baseline for
the intentions and conditionality of hospitality that existed previous to the current
displacement.
Arabic was the official language of education in Sinjar as it fell in Nineveh. However,
after the 1991 Gulf War and even more so after the 2003 Iraq War and the ouster of Ṣaddām
Ḥusayn, KRG influence and projection grew in the area, but influence over language notably
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spearheaded the efforts. In 2008, Dulz observed that the Directorate of Education in Duhok
Governorate had pushed Kurdish, not Arabic, language training for school teachers in
disputed Sinjar and regularly paid their salaries.120 She commented that it was “remarkable”
because the central Iraqi government at the same time continued to pay for and administer
other essential services in Sinjar, like water and sanitation, and Ministry of Interior functions
(like the Iraqi Federal Police, IP), a pattern which repeated itself after 2014 (See Photograph
17).121
Upon closer inspection, the seeming dichotomy between Arbīl and Baghdad was not
so clearly opposed and binary. Language, in particular, was an essential platform for
extending thresholds of a Kurdish ‘homeland,’ but it was also subtle and strategic. The KRG
could influence the language spoken in the home, but did not have to take on all the
responsibilities that would come with being master of the house, like paying for essential
services.
The crossover of linguistic and ethnic identity also complicated the issue further. In
Ba’ashīqah, where some Yezidis speak Arabic, some go even further and consider themselves
ethnically Arab, in part claiming to be from Shaykh ‘Adi’s Arab lineage.122 The safety of
Kurdish influence did enable Yezidis in the town to set up their own religious schools in the
late 1990s and early 2000s, and they notably included instruction for both boys and girls.123
However, though Yezidi prayers retained and were recited in Kurdish, Arabic became the
main language in which classes were taught.124
Yezidis in Sinjar and Ba’ashīqah had grown up speaking Arabic, Arabic was taught in
schools, and Kurdish efforts to promote the Kurdish language did not go unnoticed. A study
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on Kurdish schooling concluded that some in minority communities like the Yezidis also see
the KRG’s education program as ‘sinister,’ ‘predatory,’ driven by nationalism, and that it
“strives to ‘eliminate other cultures and languages’ in order to achieve the illusion of ethnic
dominance on the ground.”125 The same report cites that in 2013 (before the crisis) the KRG
announced plans to open 14 new schools (teaching the Kurdish language) in the Sinjar area,
despite protests from many that they spoke Arabic at home and that the penalty for parental
resistance to the efforts could include coercion and being imprisoned.126 (See Photograph 41
of a school that was constructed after the displacement during KRG control of the Sinjar
area).
Alongside language training, the PDK also set up political party offices in Sinjar and
Shaykhan.127 Further, even before the displacement, battle, and recapture of Sinjar, Dulz
observed that the PDK and PUK party offices in Sinjar City resembled fortified military
outposts rather than civilian structures.128 After the bombardment and liberation, this was
even more the case, with concrete blast walls, armed guards, and flags regularly adorning
offices.
Even ten years ago, Dulz concluded that the ruling PDK employed a two-fold
approach to Yezidis that first involved using party-tied media to promote the narrative that
Yezidis were ethnic Kurds and “brothers.”129 Second, building on that foundation, Kurds coopted Yezidis into larger agendas. One of the challenges was that the GoI had so poorly
provided for the Yezidis, particularly in frontier Sinjar, that KRG efforts did result in
desperately needed increases in access to services like schooling, literacy, political

125

Shanks, Kelsey. "The Changing Role of Education in the Iraqi Disputed Territories:
Assimilation, Segregation and Indoctrination." Globalisation, Societies and Education 14, no.
3 (2016): 422-33, pp. 427
126
Ibid
127
Dulz, et al. “Persecuted and Co-opted,” p. 37
128
Ibid, p. 34
129
Ibid, p. 39
43

participation, religious freedom, resources, income, jobs, and so forth. Maisel cites, for
example, that in the Jazīrah, “with a population of 25,000, there were only two elementary
schools in which six teachers took care of 1,000 students. There was no secondary school.”130
A UN HABITAT report remarks that, despite the offset provided by the urban capital of
Mosul, “Ninewa [Nineveh] ranks among some of the poorest governorates in Iraq [and] food
insecurity grew significantly in the last decade due to prolonged drought. In 2011, 26% of the
population lived below the poverty line of US$2.5 per day, more than double the national
level (11.5%). The literacy rate of 75.5% is lower than the national average. Rural
intermediate school enrolment rates are among the worst in Iraq.”131
Ruling Kurds also did not have a difficult time providing a seemingly safer and more
free home to Yezidis. In 2004, because of increasing Arab Muslim attacks, the Yezidi Emir
Tahsin Beg had to announce a temporary suspension of Yezidi religious pilgrimages and
feasts in Lalish.132 Also in the mid-2000s, several assassination attempts were made against
Yezidi leaders, including the Emir, a civil minister, and the mayor of Sinjar.133 Particularly
during the 2003 Iraq War, Arab nationalists also targeted Yezidis who identified themselves
or who were identified by others as Kurds because they generally perceived them to be
sympathetic with Americans.134 By 2007, no Yezidis would travel to places like Tal ‘Afar
and Mosul.
But, Kurdish hospitality came with a reciprocal conditionality. Yezidis experienced
interference during elections in 2005, prompting Maisel to observe that, “it becomes obvious
that support from the Kurdish parties is not granted wholeheartedly and on the basis of
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common Kurdishness, but for political benefits.”135 Minority groups other than the Yezidis
also faced similar problems. The International Crisis Group reported that Hunein Qaddu, the
leader of a Shabak political party, when commenting on the 2005 elections, accused KRG
President Barzani and the Kurds as setting themselves up as the minority group’s “only
possible protector.”136 In a Washington Post article in 2005, a Yezidi woman in Sinjar is
quoted, “We do have freedom, but the invasion of the Kurds and all their peshmerga and
money from the north are overwhelming us.”137 The woman said she wanted her children to
learn Arabic, but was not able because only Kurdish was being taught in the newly re-opened
schools.138 The community accused Yezidi election officials of being "bought" by the PDK
and PUK and in the 2005 elections, 80,000 votes were cast for KDP in Sinjar area, while only
11,000 were cast for the Yezidi party.139 “Desperate for help, the village [of Karsy, on Sinjar
Mountain, See Appendix: Maps. See also, for example, Photograph 41] welcomed Kurdish
funds for refurbishing its school. In return, the whole village voted for the KDP in the Dec.
15 election.”140 The PDK provided monthly stipends to Sinjar residents stuck in poverty,
employed 1,200 teachers, and paid for school facilities in the area.141
Notwithstanding, Baghdad also continued efforts. After the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), the Constitution of Iraq was formed in 2005, and Section 1 (Fundamental
Principles), Article 2, Subsection 2 explicitly lists Yezidi protection: “This Constitution
guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full
religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals such as
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Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans.”142 However, a less clearly written section of the
document, Article 140, created a platform for further tensions between Arbīl and Baghdad
and also affected Yezidis significantly. Article 140 called for the full implementation of
Article 58 of the previous Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which notably included
mechanisms for reversing and providing justice for people affected by Ṣaddām’s Arabization,
collectivization, and anfal campaigns. Article 58 of the TAL required homes and properties
to be restored or compensation to be provided where restoration was not feasible. TAL
Article 58, § 4 also acknowledged the problem and stipulated the right for co-opted people to
“[…] determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and
duress.”143
In addition, Article 140 of the Constitution also required disputed territories to be
normalized by referendum by the sunset date of 31 December 2007. It explicitly lists the
disputed area of Kirkuk, but does not specifically list any others, including Sinjar. Nor did it
define, provide a mechanism for, or even outline what a referendum process would look like,
who would vote in it, or who would control and conduct it. The government made several
attempts to schedule referendums, but they were regularly postponed.144 Meanwhile, rising
ethnic and theological tensions amid the war, like peak violence in 2006, made Kurdish
inclusion much more appealing, giving a more solid platform for Kurdish appropriation
efforts, despite their overt conditionality.
On 7 April 2007, a group of Yezidi men beat, stoned, and killed a 17-year-old Yezidi
girl from the community named Dua Khalīl Aswād because she had been perceived as
engaging in a romantic relationship with a Sunni Muslim man and some attackers, perhaps
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falsely, believed she had also converted to Islam.145 The particularly shocking “honor killing”
in the Yezidi stronghold of Ba’ashīqah was recorded on a cellphone video and sparked
outrage as it was distributed on the internet. It shows attackers dragging her in a headlock,
throwing a cement block at her head, and government police standing and watching as the
event unfolds.146 Two people from Dua’s family were arrested in connection with the
killing.147 According to the same report in the LA Times, earlier in February that year a Sunni
Muslim woman was killed by her family for engaging in a similar relationship with a male
Yezidi.148
Arabs also warned Yezidis to leave Mosul, but clear Yezidi exclusion from Islam and
Arab-dominated areas in Iraq did not necessarily translate into automatic Kurdish inclusion or
support from the Kurdish public, despite deliberate media efforts to bolster Kurdishness.
Unprecedented threats even started coming from Kurdish cities like Duhok, Sulaymāniyyah,
and Arbīl.149 Dulz notes that in several incidents, even within the relatively safer Kurdish
region, Yezidis were beaten, evicted from student housing, and fired from jobs.150 Despite
PDK efforts to create a narrative that included Yezidis, many Kurdish Muslims still perceived
the group as unclean and heretical and integration remains a challenge.
Meanwhile, Arab Muslim and Yezidi relations continued to deteriorate. In a reprisal
attack against the stoning of Dua, on 23 April, armed Sunni Muslim attackers halted a bus
full of laborers traveling to the village of Ba’ashīqah, the same village where Dua was from,
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selected only the Yezidi men out of the passengers of different faiths, lined 23 of them
against a wall, and shot them.151
Further, because of the upcoming referendum sunset date for the disputed Sinjar area,
on 14 August 2007, in the villages of Qahtanīyya152 and Jazīrah153 in the Tel ‘Afar and Ba’aj
areas south of Sinjar, Al-Qaeda in Iraq coordinated an attack specifically targeting Yezidis in
an aim to dissuade votes for Kurdish inclusion.154 They detonated a series of truck bombs,
killed between 500 and 1,000, and destroyed over 1,000 homes.155 At the time, it was the
worst terrorist attack in Iraq since Ṣaddām Ḥusayn was ousted and the second deadliest attack
in history, preceded only by the events of September 11th.156 However, like the relatively
unknown Yezidis it targeted, it did not receive widespread press coverage and was
overshadowed and contextually absorbed by the ongoing war and widespread violence. The
article also cites that substandard architecture in the area, predominately mud and simple
stone buildings, holdovers from collectivization, contributed to the high death toll as they
collapsed.157
In 2008, Dulz wrote that PDK officials were among the first visitors to the site after
the attack and notes that Kurdistan TV, the KDP-run satellite channel, broadcast interviews
with men in Sinjar who were thankful for the party’s response.158 The narrative in the
disputed territory juxtaposed Kurds, embodied in the ruling PDK, extending their mantle and
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Kurdish ‘home,’ and caring for their Yezidi ‘brothers’ in the face of extreme Islamic (and
ethnically Arab) violence.
However, with overt appropriation efforts from both alternative hospitality providers
common, middle positions also started to emerge among Yezidi discourses that rejected the
binary between Arbīl and Baghdad, between Kurdish and Arab (and Iraq). Also in 2007,
citing evil and aggression toward Yezidis in Shaykhan, the destruction of religious buildings,
and disowning those who were silent and had “sold their religion to the masters of material
and power,” a group of Yezidis formed a militia called the Melek al-Tawus (King Peacock)
Troop. In the statement that the group published, they made a point to emphasize that they
were "completely independent" from political party affiliation.159
Other evidence undermined the genuineness of the inclusionism expressed toward
Yezidis. While Kurdish nationalism’s primary focus on ethno-centrism gave it an ability to
overlook religious difference, tensions still permeated. Dulz notes the easily observable
reality that there are a significant number of migrant workers from other majority Muslim
nations, like Bangladesh, or other nations with majority populations that are Christian or
‘People of the Book’ employed in the KRG which do not face the same religious
discrimination as domestic Yezidis.160 Despite overt efforts to include Yezidis as ‘brothers,’
the community still faces high unemployment rates and is actively discriminated against for
its heterodoxy. Kurdish hospitality even before the 2014 forced migration crisis was
conditional and Yezidis were neither simply “guests” or equal Kurdish “brothers.” A decade
ago, Dulz noted that there was still widespread unemployment in the mujamma’at and that
the ruling Kurdish PDK party, remained, in many cases, the dominant employer, reinforcing
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its dependency networks.161 In Sinjar, “for countless impoverished families in the region,
Kurdish patronage is the only available source of income.”162
In many cases, control of the relationship of hospitality included quite literal symbols
and themes of a classic familial home, and policies targeted basic home needs like providing
food, shelter, and a place to settle. The KRG, for example, prevented Yezidis from Sinjar,
Shaykhan, and Ba’ashīqah “from registering with the PDS (Public Distribution System),
since they are not allowed to transfer their ration cards from their place of origin.”163 The
Public Distribution System (PDS) is a rations scheme that was implemented in the early
1990s as a part the UN Oil-for-Food programme and was a response to embargoes and
sanctions against Iraq. The ration system resulted in nearly all Iraqi families being issued
PDS identification cards which have become widely used as a standard form of ID and
official document used when interacting with the government, even as ID for voting in
elections.164
The use of specifically food ration cards as the simultaneous means of proving name
and identification, the means of accessing sustenance in the form of food, and access to
political participation and voting was symptomatic of a wider power dynamic that is common
in Iraq that conflated the state as the master of the house, the one who names, and the paternal
breadwinner. One of the consequences of such an arrangement, though, is that the master can
then use the access to food (and its distribution) and political participation to exercise control
and set expectations of conditional loyalty. Dulz cites the Kurdish example where IDPs to
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Kurdistan from Duhok were pushed to return back to Kirkuk by the PDK and PUK when the
parties distributed their food rations there and not in locations of displacement.165
Assimilation (and hospitality, hosting) was not preferred especially because Kurdish presence
in Kirkuk was needed for territorial claims of legitimation and control of its vast oil reserves.
Dulz concludes that Yezidis had been “deliberately forced to stay outside the secure Kurdish
administered region to uphold the nationalist claims of the Kurdish parties on a ‘Greater
Kurdistan.’”166
Blatantly conditional and loaded hospitality did cause Yezidis to explore avenues for
pushing back and they are not relegated to the state of absolute non-participation simply
because of their vulnerability to co-option. For example, in the past, Yezidi leaders have
threatened Kurdish leaders that they would identify themselves as Arab.167 However, this
option, and others, are becoming increasingly unrealistic and rare for the Yezidi community
as Yezidis and Arabs have suffered a catastrophic harm to their relations in the form of ISIS.
At the same time that Kurdification is becoming progressively the only viable choice,
reduction into that binary extreme also spells even greater conditional compromise.
However, as Derrida shows, binary reductionism also betrays its own structural flaws
in that, as well as being and avenue for external co-option, identity formation has realistically
become a choice among Yezidis. Dulz cites Spät’s travels to the region in 2005 and a curious
interaction she had with a taxi driver from Ba’ashīqah. When questioned about the Kurdish
ethnic roots of Yezidism, “firstly, he explained that he was not a Kurd. He later added to the
question if all Yezidi were not Kurds: “Oh yes, now we are Kurds. […] Before it was not
good to be a Kurd; now it is better to be one.”168
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By 2014, before the crisis, Barir observed that a “new Yezidi discourse” had emerged
with a set intention to “consolidate an alternative collective identity for a community all too
familiar with oppression and disappointment, and to root it in the collective trauma of past
persecutions.”169 The ‘new narrative’ was a pushback against external efforts to absorb
Yezidis, insisted that Yezidis were utterly unique, and ignored or downplayed cultural ties
like ethnic lineage and language, instead opting toward a central foundation of shared trauma
and persecution. While it set up spurious binaries of its own, like the community facing a
uniquely high severity of trauma versus others who purportedly suffered less, the Yezidi
discourse nevertheless gained traction. However, it was as much a reactionary statement
against appropriation as it was a positive shift toward new structure of memory. Moreover, it
did not address any of the systemic problems inherent to linguistic reductions and co-options,
but rather tried to reverse the binary to where the privileged power was in the hand of the
community rather than the actors around them.
Instead, the spurious foundations of the new memory left the Yezidis as vulnerable to
appropriation as they had ever been and the community was about to face an unprecedented
trauma, persecution, and uncertain future.
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Chapter 2 - Yezidis as Guests / Hospitality, Crisis, and Co-option in the Present
The idea behind deconstruction is to deconstruct the workings of strong nation
states with rigorous immigration policies, to deconstruct the rhetoric, the
politics, and the metaphysics of native land and native tongue, the politics of
sites, of propria and my-ownness, to remain as vigilant as possible about the
community of fusion. The idea is to disarm the bomb of identity that nationstates build to defend themselves against the stranger, against […] immigrants,
[…] against all the Others, all the other Others, all of whom according to an
impossible formula, a formula of the impossible, are wholly other.170
Older historical trends of Yezidis being named as heterodox, distanced as foreigners,
and persecuted for their difference started to change with the advent of Kurdish ethnonationalism. Particularly after the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, the ruling
Kurdish PDK progressively gained more influence and increasingly employed inclusive, even
familial, rhetoric that sought to include Yezidis under a nascent and formative umbrella of
‘Kurdishness.’ However, the 2014 Yezidi crisis that gave rise to the current hospitality
relationship was an unprecedented catalyst and window of opportunity that caused those
narratives to expand into full co-option, culminating in the September 2017 independence
referendum and its related politics, which was the likeliest bid for autonomy that the region
had experienced in close to a century.
In the three years between the mass displacement and the referendum in which
Yezidis have been ‘hosted’ in the Kurdistan Region (and in disputed areas outside of it), the
Kurdish government, contradicting longstanding trends of establishing Yezidis as foreign,
instead deliberately politicized and appropriated Yezidi cultural memories, trauma, ethnic
identity, and physical territory and downplayed their differentiation.
Bowlby articulates in the prefaced translator’s note to Derrida’s Of Hospitality that
both the French word étranger and the Greek word xenos (from which a far more common
term in migration studies, xenophobia, derives) both capture the equivalent terms ‘foreigner’

170

Caputo, “A Community without Truth,” p. 29
53

and ‘stranger’ in English.171 Moreover, Dufourmantelle further notes the pivotal antinomy
contained within the Latin word hostis which “means guest but also enemy.”172 It is the same
root from which words like hospitality, host, hotel, hostel, hospital, and hospice eventually
derive. Each seemingly communicates welcome, comfort, healing, refuge, and care. On the
other hand, hostis is simultaneously the source of words like hostile and hostage, and
conveys, for instance, power, as in the English Biblical translation ‘Lord of hosts,’ describing
the omnipotent and omniscient Lord God of earthly armies and the angel armies of
Heaven.173 The curious wordplay hints at an inherent linguistic instability that reflects a
deeper, underlying instability in the binary of host and guest.
As Dufourmantelle comments, Derrida’s textual deconstruction is an “obsession”174 in
which there is a relentless pursuit of revealing and maintaining aporias, or inevitable
tensions. In one look at a written text, in the Apology of Socrates, the titular character claims
to be a foreigner to the rhetorical language of the courts in which he is on trial for his life and
asks for the hospitality of being afforded his plain speak.175 He is not unlike the modern
refugee or displaced person, like a Yezidi, who, finding themselves as a guest in complicated,
legal frameworks and rhetorical narratives to which they are also a foreign, faces
conditionality from the outset. And, one might immediately ask, as is commonly stated, “but,
is this really unreasonable? How could hospitality be exercised without at least a basic
framework, the courts, a regime, or an arrangement of expectations?”
But Derrida prompts, “That is where the question of hospitality begins: must we ask the
foreigner to understand us, to speak our language, in all the senses of this term, in all its
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possible extensions, before being able and so as to be able to welcome him into our
country?”176 At the precise moment of the question, the ideal of hyperbolic hospitality would
clearly answer in the negative. The guest should be welcomed without condition, without
even asking for a name by which to call the new arrival at the border, without what Derrida
calls the first and inevitable violence177 of practical, conditional hospitality.178 The refugee
should not have to defend their cause, ask for protection in their flight, in a language, a
rhetoric, legal or otherwise, that is not their own. The ideal would demand that not even a
name be asked for or handed down. Still proposes that it would be better to ask the subject,
‘what is your name?,’ but both she and Derrida see that in pure hospitality, even the question
ought not to be asked.179 However, Derrida does not leave the question there. He also does
not then simply reverse the binary and privilege the opposite. Rather, through more textual
deconstruction, without leaving the same moment of the question, he shows that, on the other
hand, considering The law of unconditional hospitality as ultimate shows problematic
instability as well. Deconstruction deliberately exposes enough discomfort to keep questions
“testify[ing] without end in our memory.”180
The second of the two lectures in Of Hospitality ends with epigraphs to two
distressing chapters in the Hebrew Bible that consider the limits of unconditional hospitality;
Genesis 19 and Judges 19. In the former, two angels are sent to the city of Sodom to destroy
it because of the wickedness of the people in it and save Lot and his family. After Lot insists
that the angels stay as guests in his home, local men from the city demand that Lot hand over
the new arrivals so that they can rape them. Lot, rather than violate an unconditional
hospitality that he had elevated close to ultimate, instead offers to give his two daughters to
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the crowd, a heinous act avoided only by the angels intervening. In the latter, a similar
account where the men of Gibeah demand a host to give his traveler guest to them. The host
instead offers to release his daughter and the traveler’s concubine. The concubine is taken for
the night, raped, and is found unresponsive at the threshold of the host’s door in the morning.
The concubine’s “master,” the traveling guest at the home, then takes her back to his own
home, cuts her body into twelve pieces, and distributes the limbs across Israel as a testimony
to the atrocity. Derrida ends by asking, “are we the heirs to this tradition of hospitality?”181
Can untethered, unconditional hospitality ever be placed as ultimate or above ethics? In the
same way that the answer to the questions of laying down conditions is ideally, ‘no,’ at the
same time, the answer to total unconditionality is also clearly, ‘no.’
Forced displacement crises like the current Yezidi emergency sit exactly in this
aporia, the disjunction of the two extremes between binaries like linguistic reductions
between foreigner and family and seeming oppositions like the abstract Law of hospitality
and the inevitable conditions and decisions that must guide it if it is ever to be possible and
effective. Deconstruction insists on a constant, inescapable, irreducible tension that must
always be maintained between the conditional and the hyperbolic. For Yezidis, the question
is whether the tension between practical conditions and the spirit of abstract, theoretical
hospitality is held in well-judged balance or if one of the elements is overly skewed, and it
corresponds to the tension or privileging that occurs in defining the group as foreign or
family.
ISIS controlled the city of Sinjar and the areas surrounding the mountain range from
its initial assault in August 2014 to the winter of 2015 and in the course of the year executed
mass numbers of Yezidis, bought and sold Yezidis into sexual slavery, and deliberately
destroyed religious sites. Additionally, ISIS fighters entrenched themselves into the urban
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environment, dug tunnels, converted civilian buildings into fortifications, and stole or
appropriated infrastructure for larger combat ends. Repeated coalition airstrikes targeted the
zealous fighters, resulting in large craters and entire sections of the city being destroyed. The
combined fighting and demolition brought to rubble or partially damaged over 2,300 homes,
business, and other structures.182 ISIS desecration of the Yezidi homeland and religious sites,
continual fighting and airstrikes, and the armed operation that eventually recaptured the city
together enshrined a visceral and shocking environment dotted with mass graves, riddled with
bullet holes, and rigged with improvised explosive devices set to trigger if any Yezidis did
venture to return home. Sinjar city was left as a visibly scarred and jarring expression of the
same level of treatment that Yezidi people faced (See Appendix: Photographs).
As Barir notes, for a period immediately after the Yezidi genocide in August 2014,
Yezidi leaders affiliated with the ruling Kurdish PDK quieted their rhetoric.183 He goes
further to observe that, “while Yezidis blame IS for the atrocities perpetrated against them,
they assign equal if not greater blame to the Iraqi Kurdistan leadership for abandoning them,”
despite the KRG’s consistent claim that Yezidis are Kurdish “flesh and blood.”184 The
unprecedented attack on Sinjar and its particularly heinous violence pushed Yezidis back
toward the binary of being foreign, persecuted, and marginalized, and revitalized mythic and
historical sentiments among Yezidis that harkened back to the wider, ironically Kurdish
axiom of having ‘no friends but the mountains.’ A Reuters report quoted a Sinjari Yezidi man
who had fought ISIS and fled to the Mountain during the August 2014 attack. In December of
the same year, he cites that 1,700 Yezidi families185 were still sheltering on Sinjar, and
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notably reinforced Yezidi oral theological heritage and the mythological identification with
the Mountain: "Our faith in God and this mountain was strong. […] Our fathers and
grandfathers used to talk about past genocides and we didn't really believe them, but it
happened again."186 Once the corridor to the Syrian border had been opened by the PKK,
YPG, and affiliate groups allowing for escape, despite being surrounded by ISIS, many
Yezidis instead elected to stay, and when prompted for the reason why, the same man instead
of trusting government or other forces said, “this mountain is the safest and best place.”187
Despite the KRG’s efforts during the previous decades to set themselves up as
‘brothers’ and protectors of Yezidis, specifically Sinjaris started to question the genuineness
and extent of those claims. A news article cites another interview with BAS News in which
Qassem Shesho, a Yezidi hero figure trusted among the community, described that Kurdish
Peshmerga retreated even before fighting began.188 Amidst the chaos, allegations emerged in
Yezidi and Kurdish media sources that officials had deliberately ordered the retreat, but the
accusations were denied.189 Some circulated Yezidi narratives even included allegations that
the KRG had withdrawn some 10,000 troops as ISIS advanced or that KRG-SF commanders
had even colluded with ISIS and exchanged Yezidis for safe retreat passage.190
While reports, timelines, and exact figures varied, and articles from specific media
sources, like explicitly Yezidi online newspapers, are potentially highly biased in their
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presentation of the narrative, other reports and accounts corroborate that KRG-SF
undisputedly retreated back toward the Tigris frontier and the Duhok Governorate in the
Kurdistan Region. The move triggered widespread feelings among Yezidis that the KRG had
abandoned them and were, to some degree, complicit in the subsequent atrocities. This was
exacerbated after the retreat when, during the first few weeks crisis, up to 130,000191 Yezidis
were trapped on Sinjar Mountain itself, and it was separatist Kurdish and Yezidi militias (like
the PKK, YPG, and YBS), largely from Syria, not Duhok or Arbīl, who broke a corridor
through the ISIS lines and enabled safe passage off the mountain. Yezidi accounts of having
to walk tens of kilometers to the safety of the Syrian border, where they became prima
facie192 refugees, are common, with some reporting that family members died either on the
Mountain or in the flight on foot.193
The crisis also exposed the problematic that the underlying motivation and limitation
of commitment on the part of the KRG was its primary focus on Kurdish expansionism,
including projecting and reinforcing Kurdish identity and territorial control in the area. The
KRG, who had built party loyalty, allegiance, and projection capacity by hiring Kurdish
language teachers, paying ‘salaries’ to poor Yezidis, constructing cultural centers, and
bringing key leaders on to the party payroll, reinforced Yezidi dependence on its paternal role
in Sinjar. Moreover, the efforts kept Yezidis, as loyal Kurds, territorially present, thus
justifying ongoing KRG presence. However, in the 2014 retreat of KRG forces and political
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officials, the re-emergence of those policies became scandalous. Another article (not in
Kurdish media) summarizes that a PDK official (on protection of anonymity) said, “that
higher-ups in the party told representatives to keep people calm, and that if people
[constituents] in their areas of coverage left their salaries would be cut.”194 The article further
observed that another KDP official in charge of a party office in Sinjar was on political and
social media “posing with various weapons and claiming that “until the last drop of blood we
will defend Sinjar,”” but concludes that he, along with others, were among the first to leave
as ISIS advanced from the Arab-dominated south.195 Only afterwards, in the very early
morning on 3 August, did local Yezidis take up arms against ISIS, and attempted to protect
the thousands that by then were running to the mountain for refuge. People in the towns north
of Sinjar Mountain, like Khanasour, Snuny, Karsy, and Borek only started to flee in the late
morning on 3 August. The YPG, which is a notably mixed-gender Syrian Kurdish force
affiliated with the PKK did fight, but KRG Peshmerga reportedly fled to Duhok and
abandoned successive checkpoints as waves of IDPs passed through.196
But within days, the KRG and the wider Kurdish media reinvigorated a narrative that
started with ostensibly holding people accountable and would eventually come to be a
launching pad for even more inclusive co-opting, including shared experience language, like
“us” and “our,” tied to Kurdish nationalism. President Barzani announced that his
government would investigate and punish officers in the armed forces who had retreated.197 A
week later, the overall commander of Kurdish Peshmerga forces published a letter in a
Kurdish daily newspaper, vaguely and blanketly saying, “After the catastrophe visited upon
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the Yazidis, all the political, security and military officials responsible have been relieved of
their positions” and appropriated the conflict as a Kurdish conflict: “What happened in Sinjar
did not happen to the Yazidis alone; it is an injury that has hurt us all.”198
The assault and early Yezidi feelings against the KRG of abandonment and betrayal
did provide a small window and platform for the rise of Yezidi hero figures and alternative
spaces for Yezidi discourses outside of the binary between Arbīl and Baghdad. However, the
KRG, following patterns it had developed in previous decades, did not leave the opportunity
open for long and quickly exerted its influence among even Yezidi leaders and co-opted the
community’s veneration and support of them into support for the larger Kurdish cause. The
KRG employed similar methodology with hero figures (and thus their followers) that it had
before, reinforcing and consolidating Yezidi dependence on it as ‘master of the house,’
protector, and provider.
In autumn 2014, as ISIS surrounded Sinjar Mountain and captured several large
Yezidi villages (particularly north of the Mountain), two members of the Yezidi diaspora
from Germany, Qassem Shesho and his nephew Haider Shesho, traveled back to Sinjar, took
up arms, and started militias.199 Qassem Shesho, a Yezidi whose village had been destroyed
by Ṣaddām Ḥusayn in the 1980s, had started as a mountain rebel fighting against the
Ba’aths.200 In 1989, he, along with his family, emigrated to Germany and became a part of
the Yezidi diaspora. After returning, Qassem and Haider reportedly defended the sacred
Yezidi mountainside village (and Yezidi holy temple) of Sharf al-Dīn (See Photograph 40)
against ISIS and, in an interview, he said when the militia had captured four ISIS members,
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“We executed them in the name of our people.”201 ISIS never captured Sharf al-Dīn and
legends of the defense of the village spread widely in the Yezidi community, developing an
almost mythic aura. Haider became a popular Yezidi name for newborns. The leader’s status
garnered support and, at the time, the Shesho’s militia was cited at a strength of about 2,000
fighters from the Sinjar area, many of whom were Yezidis disenchanted with both the KRG
and central Iraqi government.202
A reporter remarked that when Haider visited a Yezidi IDP camp, “A Yazidi flag was
draped over his shoulders like a cloak, and, indeed, he is a kind of caped super-hero for
Sinjar, one who swooped in from Germany when the regular police and military couldn’t rid
the city of monsters and criminals.”203 According to the article, as he greeted the crowd, he
was treated like a “relative” and “family” and the people called out “All Yazidis are Haydar
Shesho.”204 Haider used the opportunity to state that, “We fight only for Yazidis, not for any
party,” and further that, “Only Yazidis can rule Yazidis now.”205 Another article quotes a
Yezidi militia spokesperson stating the obvious of Shesho, “He’s a very important symbol for
the Yazidis.”206
Because KRG Peshmerga had withdrawn, and Yezidis became trapped or captured,
and because of hero figures like the Sheshos and efforts of Yezidi militias, narratives
emerged among Yezidis and Yezidi media of wanting to found their own homeland in Sinjar

201

Ibid
Ibid
203
Van Den Toorn, Christine. "The Hero Yazidis Hope Will Save Them." The Daily Beast,
May 10, 2015. The Yezidi flag is white, with a large red strip running horizontally in the
middle, and (similar to the KRG flag) a 24-pointed sun against the red backdrop.
204
Ibid
205
Ibid
206
Krohn, Jonathan, and Richard Spencer. "Yazidi Leader 'arrested by Kurdish
Authorities'." The Telegraph, April 6, 2015.
202

62

and defend it independently of political party allegiance.207 The traces of some of these early
narratives are still visible in common Yezidi petitions to have an international protection
force control Sinjar rather than the disputing governments. The media and Yezidi militia
forces accused the closely-party-tied Peshmerga of disarming Yezidi militias prior to the ISIS
assault and that, because Yezidi militia commanders did not want to become PDK party
members, they were not given support and protection.208
Haider’s militia, started under the name Sinjar Protection Force (HPŞ), expanded to
approximately 3,000 fighters.209 In a further and deliberate statement against the PDK, Haider
argued that Yezidis were not supported by the Kurds in their efforts and incorporated his
militia under the al-Ḥashd al-Sha’aby Popular/People’s Mobilization Force/Units
(PMF/PMU) militia scheme in Baghdad and received arms, finances, and equipment from the
central Ministry of Interior. This was the same arrangement that was used to allow Iranian
Shi’a Muslim militias to fight in Iraq. Further, in November 2015, the name of the militia
changed from Sinjar Protection Force (HPŞ) to Ezidikhan (land of Yezidis) Protection Force
(HPÊ).210
However, Haider was reportedly “arrested” by the KRG in April 2015 (before Sinjar
was recaptured from ISIS) for “creating an illegitimate militia.”211 By 2017, Haider, who was
originally affiliated with the rival Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Party based in
Sulaymāniyyah, announced the founding of his own “Yezidi Democratic Party” in the
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Kurdistan Region.212 However, at the same time, despite insisting on neutrality and a lack of
political allegiance to any party, Shesho announced that his militia, under its changed name
Ezidikhan Protection Force (HPÊ), had “been fully incorporated into the Kurdistan Region’s
Peshmerga Ministry and that they depend on the Kurdistan ministry for their salaries and
arms.”213 According to the report, Shesho’s arrest by the KRG two years previous was
“resolved” after he agreed to place the armed force under the government’s command.214
Haider’s uncle, Qassem Shesho’s forces similarly shifted to be under the control of the KRG
Peshmerga and Qassem is a member of the PDK. By 2017, Qassem commanded 8,500 KRGSF Peshmerga troops in Sinjar.215
ISIS held Sinjar City for over a year, and in the interim power vacuum where neither
the central Iraqi government or the KRG fully projected their influence as they had before,
the frontier physical and border region allowed for fringe separatist groups to gain footholds.
The PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party), a socialist Kurdish nationalist and separatist group that
had taken up arms against the Turkish Government since the 1980s actively fought ISIS and
expanded its territorial influence around the Sinjar area, gaining fighters and supporters
among the Yezidis (See Appendix: Photographs). Affiliate groups and other militias in the
area, like the Shesho’s, galvanized anti-ISIS and pro-Yezidi attitudes into other initiatives.
Yezidis in Sinjar formed and joined units like the all-Yezidi YBS (Sinjar Protection Units.
Formerly called “King Peacock”), the YJA STAR (armed “Free Women’s Units” of the
PKK), and the YJE (Ezidikhan [land of Yezidis] Women’s Units). Moreover, alongside the
larger Syrian-Kurdish YPG (People’s Protection Units), which also gained a presence in the
officially Iraqi territory, it was the loose coalitions who had created a corridor for Yezidis to
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escape off of Sinjar Mountain from 4-13 August (See Appendix: Maps). Therefore,
subsequently, the groups enjoyed popular support among Yezidis as heroes who stayed and
rescued while others abandoned, but both their presence and the narratives that they
represented would quickly be challenged by the KRG.
The Washington Agreement in September 1998 that softened the hostilities and
brokered deals on oil revenue disputes between the PDK and PUK in the Kurdish Civil War
had stipulations to not tolerate the PKK (who had fought on the side of the PUK) in Iraqi
territory. Since then, the PDK also sought to gain legitimacy especially vis-à-vis its economic
powerhouse neighbor Turkey (on whom it depends heavily for both food imports and oil
exports) and allowed Turkey to regularly target the PKK with airstrikes in the northern
mountains in Duhok that still regularly continue. While the PKK was pro-Kurdish
nationalism, it was a different nationalism (and came with a different politics) than that
supported by the KRG, despite the KRG’s inclusive language of “Kurdishness.” It is worth
noting that Turkey, the EU, and the United States classify the PKK as a terrorist organization.
Nevertheless, because of the strength and entrenchment of ISIS in Sinjar and
widespread and grassroots support among local Yezidis for the PKK and all-Yezidi militias
who had stayed and fought, the KRG-SF had no choice but to rely on and work within the
environment of the loose coalitions as it recaptured the city and region. However, this
nevertheless did not prevent the KRG from adopting a rhetoric and strategy where they
increasingly claimed sole legitimacy and mastery of the house in the disputed area from the
outset. Furthermore, the KRG simultaneously and increasingly started to employ its particular
level of influence over the Yezidi populations (and particularly the Yezidi leadership) that
was based in the other Yezidi stronghold of Shaykhan (and the sanctuary and temple in
Lalish), the seat of the Yezidi Emir and religious paramounts. Shaykhan is in much closer
physical proximity to Kurdish cities like Duhok and the Yezidi leadership there had
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historically enjoyed closer ties to the KRG via being in defacto Kurdish territory (though
Shaykhan, like Sinjar, is technically disputed). As Kurdish nationalism and the push for the
referendum would move forward, the KRG would openly and explicitly display and appeal to
the alignment of Yezidi leadership in Shaykhan with the cause, especially in its territorial and
political expansions in Sinjar. This was exacerbated by the fact that a majority of Sinjari
Yezidis, because of the forced displacement and resulting hospitality relationship in camps in
the KR-I, now lived under the effective sphere of influence in Shaykhan. Both Yezidi
leadership and the KRG would align to be in favor of the particular Kurdish nationalism
embodied in the referendum lobbied by the ruling PDK and the KRG. However, the power
move hinted toward a deeper reality that, despite being an endogamous and closed minority
group, Yezidis were nevertheless not completely united even among themselves. Particularly
those in Sinjar who had not fled to the KRG, but instead to the Mountain, or those who had
returned, started to mistrust even Yezidi leadership as it was co-opted into Kurdish
nationalism and as it seemingly downplayed or ignored some of the serious sentiments of
abandonment and traumatic memory that Sinjari Yezidis had felt.
On the day Sinjar was liberated, the KRG made a clear and visible statement of
another agenda, at the order of Kurdish President Masoud Barzani,216 by hanging a 50-meterlong KRG, and notably not Iraqi, flag on the central grain elevator, the tallest building in the
town.217 Barzani, in a press conference atop Sinjar Mountain, with the heavily damaged
Sinjar City as a backdrop, (See Photograph 14) notably stated, “Sinjar is liberated by the
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Peshmerga [using the name for KRG armed forces],” in a specific response to a question of
the role other militias played.218 He further stated that, “I congratulate the people of
Kurdistan, especially the Yezidis,” explicitly including Yezidis not simply in the Kurdish
umbrella, but more specifically as the ‘people of Kurdistan,’ the as yet evolving geopolitical
space.219 Though the referendum would not be officially announced until many months later,
he continued to co-opt trauma and memory for nationalism, stating, “Sinjar is very important
because it has become a symbol of the injustice against the people of Kurdistan,”
appropriating the injustice against the Yezidis as an affront to Kurdistan.220 Further, speaking
in a clear tone ostensibly representing a united interest and seemingly agreed solution said,
“Aside from the Kurdistan flag, we do not accept any other flag rising over Sinjar.”221 A
Reuters article also quoted Barzani adopting a familial and protective narrative, saying, “We
promised and we keep our promises: we proved to our Yazidi brothers and sisters that all
Kurdistan is behind them. Today we took revenge for every Yazidi.”222
But, for many Yezidis, the narrative had revised and brushed aside a serious
consideration of the traumatic events in 2014, particularly when KRG-SF and ISF had
withdrawn and ISIS started its genocide. Within two months of the area being retaken, 35
suspected Yezidi mass grave sites were discovered and documented around Sinjar (See
Photograph 12).223 The discoveries were part of the reason for the revival of the earlier opted
narrative among the Yezidi community to remember the past persecutions, and after the 2014
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crisis, the cry numbered “74 genocides.”224 However, themes of memory and trauma, while
raw and sensitive, particularly among the historically targeted community, continued to be
politicized and ethno-nationalistic inclusionism and “Kurdification” overshadowed.
In 2016, the KRG formed specific military units with Yezidis and 127 Yezidi women
volunteered to join a new force in the Zerevani Peshmerga (a government-supported
paramilitary group) because of the IS attack on Sinjar.225 At the graduation ceremony, the
brigade commander at the Tiger Base training facility in the border city of Feshkhabour
specifically stated in an interview with the Kurdistan 24 satellite channel that the girls’
motivation for volunteering as Peshmerga was to, “defend the soil of Kurdistan” (emphasis
added).226 One of the volunteers, a woman named Aliya from Sinjar, was also interviewed
and used familial rhetoric: “Our Ezidi [Yezidi] sisters were oppressed by IS extremists, and
we will not allow that to happen again... we will defend ourselves alongside our Peshmerga
brothers in the frontlines.”227 President Barzani, attending their graduation, employed similar
language, saying, “I am very hopeful that you will […] achieve significant victories hand in
hand with your brothers.”228
Additionally, even though the KRG utilized the same strategies as other militias,
forming ethnically based armed brigades, it downplayed any competing narrative claims that
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the factions operating in Sinjar put forward that represented alternative Yezidi sentiments,
interests, and discourses, especially those that included feelings of mistrust toward the KRG
and its Kurdish nationalism. It dismissed groups like the Turkish-originated PKK as
‘illegitimate’ and simply equivocated affiliate Yezidi forces like the YBS with the PKK,
dismissing them, and notably the narratives they represented, as well.229 The tensions
escalated and even resulted in troop deployments and eventually physical clashes.
In 2017, stresses ratcheted in the Yezidi dominated towns of Khanasour and Snuny
(both north of the Mountain). Khanasour, which is physically closer to the Syrian border (and
further from the KR-I) had by that point come to be heavily PKK-influenced (as well as
influenced by affiliate groups like the all-Yezidi YBS, the YPG, and YJA STAR) as had the
corresponding western half of Sinjar Mountain. Moreover, the PKK had a dominant presence
in several key Yezidi areas. This first included the entrance to the only road leading up to the
top of the Mountain near the village of Karsy. Second, the PKK dominated the informal IDP
settlement of Sardashde on the top of the Mountain that had burgeoned since the 2014 crisis
and notably included many Yezidi IDPs who never fled to the KRG. Finally, the PKK and its
affiliates also controlled several fortifications on the very top of the Mountain. The KRG’s
presence was relegated to only a few areas of projection and a war of branding marking
different allegiances and narratives started to pepper the entire disputed Sinjar area. One
exception for the KRG on the top of the Mountain, was in the form of the aptly named
Barzani Charity Foundation (BCF), which recalled similar patterns of projecting dependence
and influence that the KRG had employed in the previous decades around Sinjar.
BCF represented humanitarian responses that were closely tied to government efforts.
The charity is a Kurdish NGO whose primary outreaches include food and non-food item
(NFI) distributions to displaced persons inside and outside of the KRG. It is named after the
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legendary Kurdish hero figure Mustafa Barzani, who is often depicted as a mountain and
resistance Kurdish Peshmerga fighter against oppressive regimes and a leader for Kurdish
nationalism. He led the still ruling PDK from 1946 to his death in 1979, and, Masoud
Barzani, his son, took over party leadership and was the President of the KRG until 1
November 2017. The charity has been accused of being politicized and tied too closely to the
ruling Barzani family, whose religious Shaykhs had galvanized tribal leadership into early
Kurdish nationalism at the turn of the 20th century. BCF opened a large office and
distribution site on top of Sinjar Mountain next to Yezidi IDP settlements (notably flying a
prominent KRG flag, see Photograph 18), and was responsible for delivering food aid and
support items to local dependents. Before tensions between Baghdad and the KRG erupted
over the referendum, and despite being in the disputed Sinjar territory in Nineveh
Governorate, BCF had worked on behalf of the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement
in Baghdad to distribute food rations to thousands of IDP families.230
The KRG had a much more dominant presence in strategic towns like Snuny (directly
east of Khanasour) and Sinjar City itself, and PDK and Asayish (State Security) offices
operated regularly. However, while Sinjar City was KRG controlled, it also included the
tense coexistence of other militias that had helped liberate it and all of the competing sides,
including the KRG, jockeyed among the ghostly empty streets of the town to mark territory,
spray graffiti, and raise flags (See Appendix: Photographs). Furthermore, the KRG controlled
the access points and thresholds to cities like Rabi’a on the Syrian Border as well as to
markets like the KR-I and the Turkish border while the roads to Raqqah, Mosul and Tal ‘Afar
were effectively useless because of the presence of ISIS in each of the cities. Duhok
represented one of the only viable markets for agriculture and livestock that Yezidis
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produced, but for Yezidis who supported the PKK and affiliate factions, traveling through
KRG dominated areas and thresholds became problematic, exacerbating the pressure and
correlation of allegiance, dependence, and even sustenance. Unless people had ties to the
ruling party, the transport of goods and livestock to and from markets (even including
transporting home goods for returns) were regularly prevented between the KR-I and the
disputed Sinjar area.231
On the other hand, while groups like the PKK, YBS, and YPG were perceived by
Yezidis as “rescuers” and heroes, this nevertheless did not prevent them from also co-opting
Yezidis into their larger, pre-existing political agendas and using the crisis to their advantage.
The PKK, with its longstanding conflict against the Turkish government, used the same
physical features of the Mountain as a remote, frontier, and secluded place to carve a niche of
territorial control and resistance to both the Turks and the KRG. Further, on the platform of
having rescued many in the community off of the Mountain, the PKK and YPG recruited
Yezidi followers and fighters, setting itself up as a protector and provider.
However, by March of 2017, as drumbeats towards the referendum intensified, the
pressures of ethno-nationalist politicization, specific factionalized agendas, troop
deployments, dependencies, and economic isolation spilled over into violence. Seven fighters
from the all-female YJA STAR and Yezidis from the YBS were killed when they clashed
with KRG-sponsored, Syrian-originated Rojava Peshmerga that had been deployed by the
KRG near the town of Khanasour.232 Within weeks, protestors affiliated with the PKK in the
town of Khanasour again demonstrated against the KRG and Peshmerga with violent clashes
resulting in reported fatalities and blame being thrown from all sides. By then, some Yezidis
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who had previously supported the PKK and affiliate groups started to distance themselves as
they saw Yezidis becoming co-opted into a the larger, and pre-existing, PKK conflict. This
was reflected as the town of Khanasour had been largely vacant and the KRG accused the
PKK of busing Yezidis in from across the border in Kurdish Syria to show artificial support
numbers and stage a riot.
But the KRG’s rhetoric went even further. The KRG Ministry of Interior issued a
statement accusing the PKK of constantly inciting clashes, and also did not miss an
opportunity to deliberately co-opt Yezidis as family protectees at the same time: “Only the
PKK is responsible as it intentionally wants to use some Yezidi brothers [emphasis added] as
a device for a disgusting plot.”233 In a deliberate affront to the all-Yezidi YBS, the KRG
Presidency’s spokesperson was quoted as saying: “It is impossible to allow any party to
freely challenge the political will of the Kurdistan Region.”234 Despite a number of Yezidis
vocalizing that the YBS fought for their interests, the KRG’s narrative continually
downplayed their legitimacy vis-à-vis that of the government. The spokesperson continued
that, “just because they have a few people from Shingal in their ranks” did not mean that the
force had any representative authority.235
In an interview with the Kurdish satellite channel Rûdaw, when asked about the
presence of the PKK and YBS in Sinjar, the spokesperson for President Barzani simply
equivocated the YBS with the PKK and argued that they shared the same ideology.236 When
lobbed uncharacteristically pressing follow-ups by the Kurdish media interviewer about the
legitimacy of the YBS and how Yezidis largely supported them as rescuers, the Spokesperson
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still argued that the only legitimate forces are those who worked within the “framework of
[the] Kurdistan Regions armed forces.”237 Further, he appealed to a meeting that had occurred
close to the time between Yezidi leaders and Prime Minister Nechervan Barzani, and argued
that their views represented all Yezidis. He asked, “Did you see all these statements that all
the people from Shingal [emphasis added] are saying that this force should leave the area?
The Yezidi Mir, Yezidi Spiritual Council, Shingal’s mayoral council, and the Nineveh
provincial council.”238 However, notably, the Yezidi Mir (Emir) is based in Shaykhan and
even largely in the diaspora in Germany. Moreover, groups like the Nineveh provincial
council and Shingal’s mayoral council had developed close PDK ties over the previous three
decades of the government’s deliberate effort to build dependence.239
In March, Prime Minister Barzani, in an effort to gain support against the PKK and
galvanize Kurdish unity, met with the Yezidi leaders, including Prince Tahseen Beg, in
Duhok.240 On behalf of the government, he made three key promises, including working
harder to rescue remaining Yezidi captives of IS, to seek to have international actors
officially recognize the Yezidi crisis as a genocide, and to start rebuilding the devastated
Sinjar City, but cited the presence of the PKK as a hindrance.241 He employed familial
rhetoric and drew an allusion to KRG intervention in the besieged Syrian Kurdish city of
Kobani, saying, “when our brothers in Syria needed our help, we sent Peshmerga forces to
help free Kobani [from IS].”242 He continued by appealing to how, when asked, the
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Peshmerga left “without imposing ourselves,” and called on the PKK to follow the same
pattern in the Sinjar area. The Yezidi Emir Tahseen Beg is cited as praising the KRG.243 The
article finally cites that Prime Minister Barzani appealed to Yezidis to stay in Kurdistan,
saying that they could be protected there.244
But, along with even Kurdish media questioning the claims of the KRG, some
competing and even unexpected narratives also continued to find purchase, including other
attempts to co-opt, and displayed that Yezidis did not universally adopt pro-Kurdish
inclusionism. An article quotes an interview with one of the “senior leaders” in the all-Yezidi
YBS militia in which he said that Yezidis did “not accept a merger with the Kurdistan Region
and their fight is to preserve their Iraqi identity [emphasis added].”245 Like Haider Shesho’s
Yezidi militia, the YBS was also funded for some time under the al-Ḥashd al-Sha’aby
PMF/PMU militia scheme run from Baghdad. The YBS leader went further and accused the
KRG-run Roj Peshmerga Force of Syrian Kurds stationed in Snuny of targeting Yezidis
instead of the PKK.246 Moreover, he accused the Peshmerga as intending to “merge the
Shingal [Sinjar] region into the Kurdistan Region,” and followed with a call for the “Iraqi
government and Iraqi people to stand by the Iraqi Yezidis in Shingal.”247
A month later, in April 2017, the Turkish Air Force conducted coordinated air strikes
against the PKK and affiliate YPG and YBS forces on and around Sinjar Mountain and in the
Kurdish Rojava region in Syria (See Photographs 27 & 28). During the attacks, five KRG
Peshmerga were inadvertently killed and nine wounded, but the narrative from Arbīl, instead
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of being directed at Turkey, turned sharply to the PKK, the YPG, and even the all-Yezidi
YBS, ironically again invoking an unjustifiably “imposed presence.” Despite Turkey overtly
violating the same threshold of international sovereignty and killing KRG troops, the PDK
issued a statement: “Once again, we remind our people and all the other parties of the fact
that this incident or any of such kind is due to the inappropriate imposed presence [emphasis
added] of the PKK in the Kurdistan Region, which has not brought any benefits, only
chaos.”248 The KRG Ministry of Peshmerga fell in step and also used similar language: “We
also announce that all the trouble is due to the PKK’s presence in the area and their presence
has brought headache and trouble to the region’s people and the Kurdistan Region.” 249 The
leader of the ruling Syrian Kurdish party PYD also made a claim toward a competing
Kurdish nationalism, denouncing the airstrikes and lobbing that, “this attack does not scare
the Kurdistan nation.”250
The KRG developed a pattern of deflecting Kurdish blame and culpability and
repeatedly employing other reductive pro-Kurdish binaries like anti-Arabism and antiIraqism as alternative narratives, even through Yezidis closely tied to the party. But Still
notes that, “the generous and expansive state, that wishes to extend universal rights not
dependent on birthplace, becomes the nation state that defines itself against others.”251 Barir
quotes Vian Dakhil, the female, Yezidi Member of the Iraqi Parliament “expand[ing] the
scope of the Yezidi narrative of betrayal and abandonment to include the Arab neighbors of
Sinjar” in a Turkish newspaper interview. Without addressing the roles Kurdish armed forces
and their retreat played, she said of stealing property, killing Yezidis, and kidnapping girls,
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that, “All these are enormous tragedies, but ISIS is not our only problem – our Arab
neighbors betrayed us severely.”252 Vian is a member of the PDK.
Despite quieting rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the 2014 tragedy, by the time
of the referendum in late 2017, the KRG had also quickly re-engaged earlier patterns of
appropriating narrative, trauma, and memory. At a commemorative event for the third
anniversary of ISIS’ assault on Sinjar (a major event in the Yezidi community that fell about
two months before the vote), KRG Prime Minister Necherivan Barzani (who is also the
nephew of former KRG President Masoud Barzani and grandson of the Kurdish nationalist
hero Mustafa Barzani) co-opted the catastrophe not only as a Kurdish, and not just Yezidi,
issue, but as an issue for Kurdish nationalism and as a campaign platform for the referendum.
“I say this, unfortunately, that we [the Kurds] have no hope that Iraq could get better.” He
continued, with inclusive “our” language, that “Our past experience with Iraq has led us to
this conclusion that there is no way we could defend ourselves and our rights in Iraq.” 253
“Therefore, in order to maintain and protect our peace and coexistence we will have to show
our ambitions to the whole world in a referendum.” 254 Barzani said that the Yezidi massacre
that the event was remembering was undeniably a genocide, but went even further to
appropriate both the suffering and the ethnic targeting of Ṣaddām’s Anfal campaign, which
was aimed at Kurds more broadly, and co-opted the Yezidi voice: “The voice of Shingal in
this referendum is very important because it is the voice of the Anfal genocide and the voice
of the pains of our people,” said Barzani, and, like a paternal caretaker, continued, “The KRG
still feels the pain of what happened three years ago.” “The KRG will do its best to reduce the
pain of what happened to our beloved Yezidis.”255
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However, also on the third anniversary of the Sinjar massacre, a Yezidi man told a
non-Kurdish media source, Reuters, that “The Kurds and the Iraqi Government are fighting
for Sinjar and we are paying the price.” Yet, the same report quotes another Yezidi, but
notably a politician in Sinjar, the Mayor, as again deflecting to an anti-Iraqi binary, blaming
the former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on the grounds that al-Maliki was in power
at the time ISIS attacked.256
At the same time as it resumed narratives of co-option and appropriation, the KRG
also breathed new fire into development rhetoric in a similar pattern to how it announced its
plans for educational expansion in Sinjar in elections prior to the crisis. In an interview with a
Turkish news outlet, the KRG’s Minister of Housing and Reconstruction announced (two
months before the referendum) that the KRG, in partnership with the Iraqi government, was
going to reconstruct 2,000 destroyed homes in the Sinjar area in 2018.257 He cited the
economic crisis as the reason that the KRG had not previously had the budget to help develop
the “Kurdistani areas” outside the region, like Sinjar.
But Yezidi resistance to the narrative of familial and Kurdish inclusion and the overt
co-opting and politicization of events like the genocide memorial date sparked backlash.
Some Yezidis targeted the mountaintop offices of the Barzani Charity Foundation, which had
been accused of giving food and support on a partial basis and was perceived by some
Yezidis as being another political means of extending PDK influence and dependence (such
as providing food and salaries) among an already vulnerable and exploited population. At the
same time that the KRG Prime Minister Nechervan Barzani (the grandson of the Barzani after
whom the charity is named) was campaigning for the referendum on the third anniversary of
the ISIS attack, with tensions and politicization high in the run up, young people affiliated
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with the PKK, who were likely Yezidis, attempted to tear down the KRG flag at the charity’s
distribution facility on Sinjar Mountain, prompting a clash with KRG-SF.258
In late 2016, the BBC had interviewed a Yezidi teacher who said, “There is no future
for the Yazidis in Kurdistan,” a sentiment that strongly contradicted the prevailing discourse
that the KRG presented in the period between the 2014 crisis and which culminated in the
2017 referendum.259 Other minorities, including Christian groups and al-Ḥashd al-Sha’aby
militias in the Nineveh plains also decried inclusion under the Kurdish umbrella.260
Nevertheless, the KRG pressed forward, seizing the politically expedient moment to conduct
a vote even in disputed territories that it had only come to control after ISIS weakened the
GoI’s capacity to project influence.
The Kurdistan Independent and High Referendum and Electoral Commission
(IHREC) that was set up to run the vote was also chaired by President Barzani whose term
had expired in 2015, but remained in power.261 The official question and methodology of vote
was also telling. “Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani areas outside the
Region to become an independent state?” read the official ballot in Kurdish, Arabic,
Assyrian, and Turkmen, and presented a binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ choice.262 The referendum was
scheduled to be held in areas outside of the administrative region, only if local authorities
“requested” it. However, the deliberate effort of the PDK to build political foundations in

258

"PKK-Affiliated Forces Attack Humanitarian Organisation BCF." BAS News English,
August 3, 2017. BAS News is an explicitly Kurdish online-only news outlet. The article cited
that “A group of PKK-affiliated armed forces attacked…,” while other informal reports
indicated that the people involved were a small group of disgruntled and disenfranchised
Yezidis, possibly youth. Irrespective, the Yezidi sentiment of mistrust toward an overt
Kurdish presence was a driving factor.
259
Moss, Paul. "The Future of the Yazidis in Iraq." BBC News, November 4, 2016.
260
"Christian Group Warns against Inclusion of Nineveh Plains in Referendum." Rûdaw,
August 3, 2017.
261
"Kurdistan's Independence Referendum Explained." Rûdaw, September 24, 2017.
262
"Kurdistan Referendum Commission Reveals Four Language Sample Ballot." Rûdaw,
September 6, 2017.
78

locations had developed over years in disputed territories like Sinjar led to many “requests.”
In early September, the election commission announced that it would conduct voting in Sinjar
and oil-rich Kirkuk.
In addition to extending the mantle of the conceptualization of the Kurdish home to
disputed physical voting locations, the commission also created a website through which
members of the Kurdish diaspora were eligible to vote electronically in absentia. The system
was only open to citizens of the KR-I or “Kurdistani territories that are not organized under
KRI” who lived abroad (it could not be accessed from within the region), and required proof
of citizenship, like notably a Food Ration (PDS) card or an Iraqi Passport and asked the same
binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question.263
Derrida, speaking in the 1990s, discussed the rapidly expanding ability of telephone
systems and the internet (and everything they represent) in changing the face of public and
private communication and the borders of the home, the ability to host, and importantly, the
question of the State’s role in policing and controlling the then uncharted domain of
hospitality and the inviolable home.264 In the Kurdish referendum, the Election Commission’s
setup of an internet-based registration and voting system that could only be accessed from
outside the Kurdistan Region was a significant step in projecting the same threshold of
hospitality that it had physically to Yezidi IDPs, in this case to a diaspora. More importantly,
it was a deeper reflection of the deliberate effort that the government was making in the
referendum to redefine both the space of hosting and its inextricable link to also defining who
was foreign and who was family. A total of 5.34 million people were eligible to vote in areas
in which the referendum would be held, including the formal KR-I (Duhok, Arbīl,
Sulaymāniyyah, and Halabja Governorates), ‘Kurdistani areas outside the KR-I,’ and the
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diaspora. Over 1.9 million people were eligible to vote in the disputed “Kurdistani” areas
outside of the KR-I, including 890,000 in Kirkuk and 218,000 in Nineveh, which included
Sinjar.265 150,000 were expected to vote in the diaspora.266
The election commission centered its referendum operations in Nineveh in the Yezidi
town of Shaykhan, and the commission “hired” 1,400 people to work on the day of the
vote.267 The head of the election office in Shaykhan said people could vote using identity or
food ration (PDS) cards.268 The office leader also confirmed that IDPs being hosted in camps,
including the quarter million hosted Yezidis in camps, were eligible to vote, an operation
overseen by the Duhok Office.269 At the time of the referendum, the area just south of Sinjar
Mountain was controlled by al-Ḥashd al-Sha’aby militias, the northeast of the mountain was
controlled by the KRG, and the western side of the mountain and northwestern areas around
the town of Khanasour were still dominated by the PKK and its affiliate groups. The Mayor
of Sinjar City, in the same report, told Rûdaw that the government would not open polling
areas in PKK controlled territory, but had plans to transport people from areas dominated by
other actors to KRG areas, like Snuny and Sinjar City, in order to allow participation.270
However, other factors undermined and weakened the implied claims that the
referendum was genuinely and primarily an ethno-nationalist venture founded on
unadulterated self-determination. Before the vote and before central Iraqi forces retook
control of Kirkuk in October after the referendum, an article in Forbes cited that the KRG
had control of a fifth of all Iraqi oil. It went further to conclude, at the time, “If the Kurds do
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declare and maintain independence within the borders that the KRG currently controls,
Kurdistan’s oil industry would be among the top 10 largest in OPEC.”271
Yezidi leadership, on the other hand, including leaders in power centers like
Shaykhan, instead opted to support the wave toward Kurdish nationalism. The Yezididominated village of Ba’ashīqah, source of the venerated religious Qawwals, was one of the
areas that “requested” to take part in Kurdish referendum. One of the town council members,
interviewed by Kurdish media while wearing a traditional Kurdish Cilî Kurdî outfit, said that
all of the 47 villages in the area, which notably included Arab villages, “requested” that the
council vote to take part in the referendum. He cited that “Bashiqa is known for its
brotherhood and coexistence.”272 The article also interviewed the female Yezidi Member of
the Iraqi Parliament, Vian Dakhil. She predicted that most Yezidis would vote to be a part of
Kurdistan, but invoked a rhetoric of covering and safety which she notably extended to
disputed Sinjar, saying, “Here at least, the stability, safety, prosperity, and development that
exists here [Kurdistan] can also be expanded to Shingal.”273 As noted before, in addition to
being an MP, Dakhil is also a member of the ruling Kurdish PDK.274
But, in the face of continued language of stability and safety, actors around the KRG
instead condemned the referendum’s timing and purported impartiality. The UN Security
Council issued a statement expressing “concern” for the “potentially destabilizing impact” of
the referendum and cited the ongoing war against ISIS and the continued needs of Iraq’s
three million refugees and IDPs, like the hosted Yezidis. In the face of the referendum’s clear
attempt at redefining the locations of thresholds and the Kurdish home, the statement went
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further to emphasize the Security Council’s “continuing respect for the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and unity of Iraq.”275
A month before the vote, the Resident UN Humanitarian Coordinator had said that the
UN would support Kurdistan because of their “exemplary” and internationally noticed
hospitality, and had specifically cited the joint need for reconstruction to begin in Sinjar.276
However, as the referendum drew closer it became clear that dissenting voices, like those of a
number of Yezidis, and even the hospitality arrangement were being ignored and co-opted as
platforms for the nationalist cause, specifically outside actors started to distance themselves
or come out against the plebiscite.
Furthermore, tensions heightened rapidly between Baghdad and Arbīl and started
moves that would come to change territorial control from the KRG to ISF in all of the
disputed areas by the end of the year (See Appendix: Maps). The GoI cited the 2005 Iraqi
Constitution as grounds for the illegality of the vote, but the KRG fired back that Baghdad
had failed to enforce substantial parts of it, specifically the requirement in Article 140 to hold
referendums in disputed areas like Sinjar and Kirkuk by the end of 2007. Moreover, Arbīl
continued to appeal to longstanding patterns in Iraq of building central dependence that
recalled the policies the Ba’ath had used to set themselves up as breadwinners and providers
(a tactic that the KRG had also simultaneously used to its advantage for years with Sinjari
Yezidis). Speaking on disputes over salaries and oil revenue percentages, KRG President
Barzani asked of Baghdad, “What constitutional article gave you the right to cut the bread of
Kurdistan?”277
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Hospitality towards IDPs and refugees and the referendum’s goal of redefining
thresholds of control and hosting also closely coincided with themes of the home and the
family that have pervaded Kurdish politics for decades. In some cases, the ties are literal.
Mustafa Barzani, the widely revered Kurdish nationalist hero who is often depicted as a
mountain resistance soldier and dressed in Kurdish garb, was descended from the Barzan
tribe, whose religious Shaykh’s had first hosted refugees and fragmented tribes in the early
1900s. His son, Masoud Barzani, was the President of the KRG until November 2017, and
galvanized his party, the PDK, into the ruling embodiment of Kurdishness over his tenure.
Several of Masoud’s close family members also hold key government positions, a reality that
receives regular criticism. His son, Masrour Barzani, is the head of Kurdish security services
and, as previously noted, his nephew, Nechervan Barzani, is the KRG’s Prime Minister.
President Barzani also set himself up to be a paternal protector and even used
language that evoked images of a savior. In a Rûdaw article quoting a Saudi news channel’s
interview with Barzani, he said that his “duties will finish after independence is achieved”
and, in a messianic appeal, that he “was born for the independence of Kurdistan.”278
However, he also took the opportunity to say that he would not allow anyone in his family to
run for President.279
The lead up to the referendum reflected the wider tension inherent in the Yezidi
hospitality arrangement in that the space in which they were hosted, despite its conditionality,
heavy co-option, and excessive discourse, was superior than any other available choice. This
reality was part of the reason why co-option developed so blatantly and was transactional and
expectant to such a high degree. Yezidis, like other Kurds, had to navigate between a clearly
superior living arrangement of genuinely better safety, inclusion, and acceptance in the
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Kurdistan Region, but a constant awareness of the reality that being hosted in that particular
home came with its own expected acceptance of a specific and guiding narrative. The
narrative also required the cost that memory of particularly traumatic events and their
histories needed to submit to a parent framework and if they did not fit, the details and
emphasis of the memories needed to change, not the scheme.
While Yezidis represented the largest bloc of subjects that the pattern affected, other
minority discourses also faced the same challenges. A Rûdaw article highlighted a group of
Kurdish women’s’ activists who notably issued a statement in support of the referendum.
They recognized inclusive changes, like how women had become fighters in the Peshmerga,
battled ISIS, had formed all-female brigades, and had become political leaders and
journalists, but reserved that “the government, the system, and the culture is patriarchal.”280
However, despite cautioning against nationalism and other limiting factors overshadowing
gender equality, the group positively looked toward the potential Kurdish state also as an
opportunity to fight some inherent power structures, like a “legacy of colonialism.”281
The new Kurdish nationalism also represented one of the best opportunities in recent
decades for Yezidis to find an inclusive place in a newly defined ‘home.’ However, the
masters of the house had contributed to Yezidis being in a dependent relationship of power
and the same crisis that resulted in the hospitality exchange became a platform redefining the
thresholds and borders at the same moment that the guest crossed them. Crisis and
conditionality have worked in tandem to keep Yezidis as hosted guests.
Three days before the referendum, at a rally for the ‘yes’ vote, KRG President
Masoud Barzani addressed a reported crowd of 40,000 waving KRG flags. He downplayed
accusations that the KRI was dangerous to its neighbors, and the news listed him as directing
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“the Peshmerga to be prepared to “pay whatever cost” necessary to protect Kurdistan.” He
was quoted using rhetoric against Turkey and Iran, saying, “You have punished us for 100
years. Are you not tired yet?” and again invoked a self-sacrificing, savior-laden, messianic
appeal: “If you want to go back to punishment, come punish me, and leave the people of
Kurdistan.” In the same speech in which he said, “Either we live a life of subordination, or a
free life,” Barzani also highlighted the hospitality of the KRG, saying, “displaced Iraqis are
“our guests,” and “their problems are in Fallujah and Baghdad” where the Iraqi government
does not want to receive them or has problems letting them go home. Further, while thanking
the international coalition against ISIS, he instead praised the Peshmerga, “but it was us who
shed blood.”282 At a press conference the day before the referendum, Barzani was reported
discussing genocides that Iraq had inflicted on the Kurds and said, “only independence can
prevent past tragedies from happening again.” He also continued, “We are neighbours with
Iraq from this moment on.”283
For many Sinjari Yezidis, for many who had been trapped, or had family members
killed or captured, or who felt abandoned, or fled, these statements were tough to hear.
Furthermore, for the quarter million Yezidis, particularly Sinjaris, who had now been
displaced for three years, the prospects of leaving the ‘guest’ dependency relationship
remained as slim as ever, despite such ostensibly laced language of ‘inclusion.’ Disputes over
controlling and dominating Sinjar meant that even staying in tents remained a superior option
than facing still-shattered infrastructure, factional territoriality, and the prospected fears of a
repeated genocide.
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A 63-year-old Iranian Kurd who had been fighting “on the mountains for 43 years”
showing solidarity with Kurdish referendum said, deliberately in Kurdish, “the struggle of
our fathers is about to bear fruit.”284 But, for Yezidis, the pains of the community against a
backdrop of 74 genocides and repeated historical marginalization still foreshadowed a long
road ahead of being dependent guests of majority power holders as they redefined the borders
of their home and the conditions of their hospitality.
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Chapter 3 - Yezidis and Home / Power and the Future
On 25 September 2017, representing a 72 percent turnout, 3.09 million people,
including the diaspora, voted in the referendum, with 93 percent in favor of leaving Iraq and
forming an independent Kurdistan.285 The vote occurred largely without violence or clashes.
However, the attempt made by the Kurds to move toward redefining the borders, thresholds,
and family and provider inclusiveness of a new ‘Kurdistan’ home prompted forceful
responses and tensions over the definition of the place of thresholds and hospitality. The day
after, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi demanded that the KRG hand over control of its
airports to the central Iraqi authorities and Turkish President Erdogan threatened a trade
blockade, which would notably cut off a large portion of the Kurdish food supply and oil
revenues, affecting the KRG’s historical ability to project itself as a provider and host.286
However, the KRG refused.287 Four days after the referendum, in a move to reassert its
mastery and control the doors in the form of borders, the GoI ordered the stopping of all
international flights to and from the KR-I airports in Arbīl and Sulaymāniyyah.288
Protesting the move as “collective punishment,” KRG Prime Minister Nechervan
Barzani notably appealed to the hospitality of the Kurdish region as opposed to the
inadequate master of the house in Baghdad. He “added that the Kurdish airports are used to
host the 1.8 million displaced Iraqis who were not allowed to visit Baghdad when they fled
their homes caused by the war against ISIS.”289 Rhetoric and themes of hospitality, family,
and the home continued to dominate the binary discourse that evolved in the weeks after the
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referendum. The central government continued to assert its influence over the boundaries of
the home and officially requested Iran and Turkey to only deal with Baghdad in matters
relating to borders, imports and exports, and business.290 According to the Huffington Post, in
2012 the economy of Turkish exports alone to the Iraqi Kurdish region totaled USD$13
billion and construction firms had over USD$30 billion in contracts, representing major
sectors of the small economy.291 If followed through, shutting the borders down would
catastrophically undercut the KRG’s ability to exercise hosting and paternal power in
dependent networks.
Additionally, by early October the GoI, Iran, and Turkey all threatened to take
coordinated action in stopping Kurdish petroleum and gas exports if the referendum results
were not canceled.292 Turkey, Iran, and Iraq (along with Syria) all share the common
perceived threat of having significant Kurdish minority populations and face the political
potential that if the Iraqi Kurdish independence referendum was successful it could prompt a
domino effect towards Kurdish separatism in each of the countries. Moreover, the oil export
revenues that the KRG had relied upon since the PDK consolidated dominance in the 1990s
were the tap through which the party had built its dependence and allegiance networks,
including among Yezidis.
Kurdish media had presented an angry Turkish President Erdogan threatening to
“close” the “valve” of major oil exports from the KR-I to Turkey, threatening to shut down
the border crossing, and AFP citing Erdogan calling the referendum “illegitimate.”293
However, it also juxtaposed the rhetoric with KRG President Barzani speaking for Kurdistan,
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saying, “We want to be a good neighbor.”294 But, both the Kurdish media and KRG officials
were also accused of vilifying Baghdad and its efforts to reinforce its sovereignty and
mastery over the federated region. A GoI statement within days of the referendum said, “The
central government assuming control of land and air borders in the Kurdistan Region is not to
starve, prevent funds, or impose a blockade as claimed by some officials of the Kurdistan
Region,” and continued rather that the goal was to exercise “control” of the movements of
economic goods and populations across borders.295
However, the KRG also added fuel to the fire of the tensions between Baghdad.
Further displays of hospitality reflected competing claims for control, the power to define,
and the power to name. Less than two weeks after the referendum, and a week after the
airports were shut down by Baghdad, the Kurdish leader, former President of Iraq, and leader
of the rival Kurdish minority political party PUK, Jalal Talabani, died in the diaspora in
Germany. Kurds affectionately refer to him as mam Jalal, meaning “uncle Jalal,” and his
power-sharing presidency and diplomatic skills in central Iraq gave platform to the Kurds.
However, in an ironic ceremony and hospitality exchange at a disputed threshold, Talabani’s
funeral occurred on the tarmac of the same international airport in his Kurdish home city of
Sulaymāniyyah that had just been closed by the central Iraqi government. Talabani’s coffin,
with a full KRG Peshmerga parade and gun salute, sat in front of an Iraqi Airways plane, the
only commercial ones allowed to fly, and was draped in a highly visible KRG, not Iraqi, flag.
The Kurdish news report presented a specific narrative when it interviewed a Kurdish Iranian
man who was quoted saying that it felt to him like, “I lost my parents again,” and KRG
President Barzani, attending the funeral, said, “My dear brother President Mam Jalal, I will
never forget your brotherhood.”296 But, twenty years previous, Barzani had called Ṣaddām
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Ḥusayn’s army to help him oust Talabani’s PUK from Arbīl and cement PDK paternal
dominance. The orchestration and the hosting of the event sparked outrage, with several Iraqi
television channels halting coverage once they had realized the coffin had been covered in the
KRG flag.297 A member of the Iraqi parliament sharply criticized President Barzani, saying
that he “was very precise in his insult.”298
Yet, despite KRG sentiments that Baghdad was unjustly projecting influence and
control and actions like the funeral that protested it, at the same time the KRG had occupied
and set itself up as master in disputed territories like Sinjar and oil-rich Kirkuk. KRG-SF had
dominated the heavily disputed area of Kirkuk since the ISIS advance of 2014, and prompted
by the referendum, within five days the Iraqi Parliament requested that central armed forces
be directed to the city to reclaim it (and its oil fields) from Kurdish control. Indeed, in the
face of protesting Iraqi imposition of power, Kurdish forces had actually expanded their
territory by a peak estimate of 40% during the 2014 ISIS offensive, including to Yezididominated areas like Sinjar and Ba’ashīqah (See Appendix: Maps). With the central Iraqi
government focused on actively fighting a protracted war with ISIS, the KRG had set itself
up as a liberator, host, and provider. However, while the referendum was the culmination of
that window of opportunity, its timing also coincided with a drawdown of the war and the
central government and its troops were able to redirect their attention to reclaiming the
disputed areas.
On 17 October, central Iraqi armed forces took control of Kirkuk, many of its
oilfields, including its two largest, and tore down the KRG flag at the Mayor’s office, which
prompted the PUK and PDK to lob accusations against each other of “betrayal.”299 On the
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same day, central Iraqi forces also retook the Yezidi cities of Sinjar, Ba’ashīqah, and the
cities of Makhmour and Rabi’a from the KRG (See Appendix: Maps). However, a local
Yezidi armed militia which was registered as a part of the PMF / PMU was notably included
in the coalition that went to Sinjar. The Washington Post report cites local residents saying
that for the first time in 15 years, the Iraqi flag flew over Sinjar, but the statement is
misleading.300 Sinjar, which is legally in the Nineveh Governorate, has long had the presence
of central Iraqi civil services, government offices, and hospitals, and, moreover, Yezidis and
other residents not only work as Iraqi police officers, wearing Iraqi uniforms, but also
regularly fly the Iraqi flag, despite the fluctuating presence in the past of the KRG (See
Photograph 17). Despite the KRG paying political salaries and having security presence,
Baghdad (and Mosul, the Nineveh Governorate’s provincial capital) still funded hospitals,
agriculture, water and electricity, and police. Schools only became a point of contention in
the dispute as they represented the ability to control language, and along with language, the
ability to teach certain curriculum and narrative, but when it came to paying for other
essential services, the bill was left with Baghdad.
The strange relationship of strategically picking and choosing essential services based
on their potential to support Kurdish nationalism (like schools) and ignoring other less
strategic services (like infrastructure repair) translated into mixed and uneasy loyalties in the
Sinjari Yezidi community towards the KRG, especially in the aftermath of recapturing Sinjar,
when little of the city was repaired and few people were allowed to return. Many Yezidis,
despite being ethnically Kurdish, and in part because of continued historical prominence of
the Arabic language and geophysical proximity to Arab-dominated metropolitan centers like
Mosul, had stronger loyalties toward Baghdad and Iraq than the KRG. The Kurdish
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nationalist agenda actively downplayed these sentiments and promoted and equivocated
Kurdishness with independent statehood, but continued signs throughout the displacement
crisis and the different manifestations of hospitality showed both resistance and outright
contradiction to it. Some Yezidis on Sinjar, for example, regularly flew Iraqi flags and
claimed Iraqi identity in the face of overt Kurdish attempts to dissuade it both before and
after the 2014 ISIS attacks (See Photograph 31).
However, loyalties did not automatically translate toward a wholehearted support of
alternative Iraqi-centered identification as central forces re-took control. Historical
associations between the Iraqi State, ethnic Arabism, and Sunni Islamification were
exacerbated by the 2014 ISIS assault and traumatic memory to such a degree that Yezidi
discourses started to look outside the framework of the Kurdish-Iraqi duality. Additionally,
while Baghdad had continued to be a civil presence in Sinjar and had funded infrastructure,
Nineveh still lagged behind other governorates in funding and state support was less than
exemplary. Further, in contrast to the Sunni-dominated Ba’ath era, the Shi’a dominated GoI’s
al-Ḥashd al-Sha’aby militia scheme had allowed for an influx of predominantly Iranian Shi’a
militias to operate in Iraq and revived earlier historical tensions between Yezidis and Shi’a
Muslims as well. Yezidis had throughout history, including up through the Ṣaddām Ḥusayn
era, been associated with the Umayyad Caliph Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiya who is widely perceived
by Shi’a Muslims as the murderer of the venerated Shi’a Imam, Hussein ibn ‘Ali. Ibn ‘Ali’s
tomb is also in Karbala in southern Iraq, and is a major annual pilgrimage site for Shi’as, who
treat the Yezidis with contempt. The al-Ḥashd al-Sha’aby militia scheme provided an
additional 60,000 desperately needed troops to drive out ISIS as it declared a caliphate in
Iraq.301 However, by the drawdown of the war, the Shi’a militias were used to clear ISIS
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remnants in Nineveh and were eventually a part of the Iraqi forces that retook control of
Sinjar in October 2017.
Instead, as mastery of Sinjar changed for the fourth time in three years, alternative
narratives re-emerged that opposed the reduction to the oversimplified binary of being either
Iraqi or Kurdish. A Yezidi man from Sinjar named Elias gave a telling interview. In a
Washington Post article, he expresses caution even toward armed Yezidi groups, saying, “I
don’t care who holds our city, whether it’s Peshmerga or Iraqis. What we care about is living
in peace and to be protected,” and elaborates that, “Everybody claims they care about Sinjar
when, in fact, no one did anything for Sinjar. We are just a card they use when they need and
then can throw away.”302 The article also quotes the Yezidi hero figure and militia
commander Haider Shesho, who said, “Unfortunately, again, the forces that were expected to
protect the Yazidis left the Yazidis alone without firing a single bullet.”303
Despite still being on KRG payroll, Haider Shesho and his forces remained in Sinjar
City after the withdrawal of KRG Peshmerga in the morning of 17 October.304 When the
Shi’a al-Ḥashd al-Sha’aby militias entered Sinjar, apparently in contradiction to an agreement
they had previously made, they started to loot Yezidi homes.305 Foreshadowing some of the
major problems that Baghdad’s control of Sinjar will come to pose for Yezidi’s who
remained, have returned, or will return, when Shesho reportedly raised the issue of the Shi’a
militias looting Yezidi homes with the Iraqi military, commanders cited that they had no
authority to stop them.306
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Irrespective of which master of the house controls the Sinjar area, Yezidi interests
continue to be relegated within larger agendas. In On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness,
Derrida posits that “ethics is […] thoroughly coextensive with the experience of
hospitality,”307 and equivocates the discussion of morality with the treatment of the other that
arrives at the border. He takes up the question of the global refugee crisis, the systemic
reasons why it has continued to degenerate, and why it is so problematic. In an ambitious
move, he argues that the nation-state system is structurally flawed and calls to create entirely
new legal and juridico-political spaces in the form of new alternatively cosmopolitan cities of
refuge. His proposal is not simply to create new spaces within the existing global political
framework, but rather, he says, “we are dreaming of another concept, of another set of rights
for the city, of another politics of the city.”308 Further, “we would ask these new cities of
refuge to reorient the politics of the state,”309 even taking on the bastions of the seemingly
inviolable rule of national sovereignty.
In the Yezidi context, ethics takes the form of hospitality in the midst of a burgeoning
nationalist movement, a unique example of the same nation-state system Derrida is insistent
on destabilizing as inadequate. Derrida says, “I also imagine the experience of cities of refuge
as giving rise to a place (lieu) for reflection – for reflection on the questions of asylum and
hospitality – and for a new order of law and a democracy to come to be put to the test
(expérimentation).”310 While the cities that Derrida theorizes do not yet exist, the spirit of his
call for reflection does. In the Yezidi hospitality exchange, the policies and practices of cooption used by the different nation-states that fluctuated and served as the hosts for Yezidi
IDPs show imbalances between conditionality and the ideal. State interests, including
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nationalistic, ethno-centric, and territorial expansionism displayed clear patterns of usurping
Yezidi interests into wider, reductive understandings that unethically ignored and, worse, coopted Yezidi trauma, memories, and future durable solutions.
In Of Hospitality, Derrida posits that,
“Displaced persons,” exiles, those who are deported, expelled, rootless,
nomads, all share two sources of sighs, two nostalgias: their dead ones and their
language. On the one hand, they would like to return, at least on a pilgrimage,
to the places where their buried dead have their last resting place (the last resting
place of family here situates the ethos, the key habitation for defining home, the
city or country where relatives, father, mother, grandparents are at rest in a rest
that is the place of immobility from which to measure all the journeys and all
the distancings). On the other hand, exiles, the deported, the expelled, the
rootless, the stateless, lawless nomads, absolute foreigners, often continue to
recognize the language, what is called the mother tongue, as their ultimate
homeland, and even their last resting place. This was Hannah Arendt’s response
on one occasion: she no longer felt German except in language, as though the
language were a remains of belonging […].311
Derrida considers Oedipus (in Oedipus at Colonus), who murdered his father and
married his mother, as he decides to show hospitality to his daughter/sister Antigone’s
happiness and peace by keeping the location of his final burial a secret. He seeks to protect
her by cutting off the possibility of spatial grieving, mourning, and memory of the shame of
the family’s strange situation. However, Derrida shows that in the same precise moment,
Oedipus also inhospitably creates a perpetual, impossible mourning. Without a grave, there is
no place for closure, no knowledge of a final resting place and no opportunity for grief. In the
same moment, there is both a presence and complete lack of hospitality. Hospitality in
general follows that pattern, being both a paradoxical welcome and differentiation. A home
that at the same time that it is created, also creates a threshold, a border, and a line that can
only be crossed on condition.
The discovery of mass graves and execution sites after the liberation of Sinjar
prompted the start of constructing memory, loss, and closure for the Yezidi community, but
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each was regularly co-opted or, in the very least, effectively prevented either by active
narratives or physical and security barriers to return. Yezidis had to construct memory and
process grief as guests in a place where the recollection of that memory posed a threat to the
hospitality they were being shown.
The different hosting governments and their interests have created a paradox of
mourning, the impossibility of mourning, as Derrida describes through Oedipus. The masters
of the house, the government and actors who held the keys to the city up until the
referendum, who were at the same time the masters of the house for Yezidis in camps across
Duhok, had co-opted the moment into Kurdish nationalism. Political infighting between
Yezidi and Kurdish militias, who are hailed as heroes, and the KRG authorities, and
eventually Iraqi forces and al-Ḥashd al-Sha’aby militias, kept Sinjar City unstable and
practically inaccessible for returnees. By the middle of 2017, less than a thousand families
had returned to the city itself and little redevelopment had occurred. The result is that Yezidis
who wish to mourn have a seemingly permanent preserved and visible memorial of
destruction in the form of the uninhabited city with its guardian hosts and their ulterior
motives, but at the same time, it is almost entirely inaccessible because of the actions of the
same hosts who dispute it. Like Oedipus in his placeless burial, the city haunts as a reminder
of failed and co-opted hospitality. To KRG, it is a revenant, living (and ghostly dead) legacy
of a withdrawal, re-appropriation, and now failed bid toward nationalistic inclusion. To
Yezidis, it is a co-opted memorial to the unnamed and unidentified missing, the kidnapped,
the killed, shattered lives, and a perpetual reminder of the conditional rules of hospitality that
take the form of flags over the both the home city and the camps. It is a ghost of a home that
constantly testifies to the inability to return home, to both physical buildings now destroyed,
but also to the closure of grief and memory.
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At the same time, Yezidis who are unable to openly process the memory of the 2014
crisis for fear and risk of coming against their host’s sensitive narrative, the place of language
as a ‘home,’ as Derrida describes, also remains a linked challenge. In the same pattern that
Yezidi ethnic experiences were glossed over and co-opted into the greater Kurdish cause,
language in both its literal and thematic senses was also appropriated. In the broader sense,
language is inextricably linked to rhetoric and the community’s descriptive ability to
articulate its own cultural narrative, which could occur and has occurred also in Kurdish. On
the other hand, in the narrow, literal sense, the dominance of the Arabic language in Sinjar
was a more direct point of confrontation, as it also represented, via reductive understanding,
the persistence of a narrative of Arabism, Islamism, and pro-Iraq sentiments.
In both cases, the KRG dominated the formation of accounts in Kurdish but also made
deliberate efforts to literally promote the Kurdish language in general over Arabic and to
even suppress the latter, despite protests among Yezidis that it was what they knew and grew
up with. In both cases, the efforts were affronts to trusted places of ‘home,’ showing that not
only did the hospitality relationship in this case define the borders and thresholds of the home
in which Yezidis were hosted, but that it went further to also project and redefine the home
from which they fled and to which they cannot realistically return in the near future.
Furthermore, any prospect of return has now been complicated by the fact that the home from
which Yezidis fled is inevitably shaped and defined differently.
Dikeç observes that “the notion of hospitality, simply because it is almost always
taken for granted as implying a desirable quality, invites critical reflection. It is, perhaps, not
always liberating and emancipatory, but, on the contrary, may conceal an oppressive aspect
beneath its welcoming surface.”312 Hospitality, like any other relationship of power, can be
abused. But, there is a particularly dangerous aspect and one-sidedness to the ancient
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relationship, especially in the context of the vulnerabilities and dependencies of guests, and
even more so in the form of forced migrants. Derrida’s (and not his alone) cautions are
toward a nation-state system that is responsible for hospitality toward the displaced, most
often enshrined through legal regimes, but one that is also simultaneously often a contributor
to the very factors that give rise to crises. The inherent paradoxes of hospitality, which first
defines, names, and differentiates the other, and later sets down conditions for re-acceptance
and welcome, reflect systemic challenges in a world where nations do the same to foreigners,
refugees, and the displaced.
Derrida also asks of a new concept of hospitality, “How might it be adapted to the
pressing urgencies which summon and overwhelm us? How might it respond to
unprecedented tragedies and injunctions which serve to constrain and hinder it?”313 As an
example of an unprecedented tragedy, the Yezidi forced migration raises difficult questions at
the extreme limits of hospitality. It prompts a discussion of the place of decision making
within stress and pressure, not simply between competing ideas, but also the tension of time
and historical events. What do ethics and hospitality look like for guests as a nation is
legitimately born, as the thresholds and borders of the home are being redefined as the guest
crosses them? If the inherent weaknesses in the nation-state system prompted the creation of
the crisis, how can the same system be the solution? But, even here, with deconstruction often
misunderstood as only allowing total undecidability, Derrida argues that it is in fact the
opposite:
“Far from opposing undecidability to decision, I would argue that there would
be no decision, in the strong sense of the word, in ethics, in politics, no decision,
and thus no responsibility, without the experience of some undecidability. If
you don’t experience some undecidability, then the decision would simply be
the application of a programme, the consequence of a premiss or of a matrix. So
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a decision has to go through some impossibility in order for it to be a
decision.”314
For Derrida, the places of aporia make decision possible. The Yezidi dilemma is
certainly such a place. Competing narratives and contemporary clashes between incipient
nationalism and rising global refugee numbers are the apex of tension. Deconstruction helps
to understand it better. For Derrida, ultimately:
“It is a question of knowing how to transform and improve the law, and of
knowing if this improvement is possible within an historical space which takes
place between the Law of an unconditional hospitality, offered a priori to every
other, to all newcomers, whoever they may be, and the conditional laws of a
right to hospitality, without which The unconditional Law of hospitality would
be in danger of remaining a pious and irresponsible desire, without form and
without potency, and of even being perverted at any moment.”315
At the conditional end of the binary in hospitality, reasonable expectations are placed
on guests that include agreements, for example, to not violate the laws of the host or country,
to not try to harm or destabilize the home, and so forth. However, the holder of power, most
clearly, but not exclusively the host, has the ability to define what constitutes instability or
harm and it is related to how the same power holder also defines the thresholds of what is
foreign, strange, or even enemy. In the case of the KRG relationship with the Yezidis, the
state hosts have clearly defined the threshold of hospitality to center around support for a
particular narrative of inclusive, big-tent Kurdish ethno-nationalism. If at any point this
threshold is crossed, even by simply recalling objectively true memories or carrying the
competing ‘home’ of a different language, for example, the guest, the Yezidi, is no longer
welcome in the hosted home and transcends that linguistic paradox of the Latin word hostis,
which means ‘guest’ but also ‘enemy.’
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On the other hand, toward the extreme of unconditionality, the ancient theory and
ideal of hospitality constantly prompts and inspires acceptance of the guest as-is, without so
much as committing any violence, without even asking for a name by which to call them or
differentiate them. In the Yezidi exchange, host policies drifted toward the binary extreme of
conditionality and upset the balance of tension. But, as the imbalance was an artificial
appropriation and shift toward expectations and unequal reciprocity, the spirit of
unconditionality constantly testified against it, and it could not sustainably last.
Baghdad continued to mount pressure against the KRG and caused the attempt at
marrying severely conditional hospitality toward Yezidis with Kurdish ethno-nationalism to
break down, and by 1 November KRG President Barzani resigned, deflating the hopes of
many Kurds as to the outcome of the referendum and nationhood. The KRG now finds itself
in the position of a guest. It remains in heated dispute with Baghdad and violent clashes
between Peshmerga on one side and ISF and the PMF/PMU on the other, particularly in
disputed areas, remain common. Challenges over appellation also continue, but in this case
from the master of the Iraqi house showing conditional hospitality to the Kurds. In the 2018
budget proposal, Baghdad names “the provinces of the [sic] Kurdistan” instead of the
officially federated “Kurdistan Region,” embracing a rhetoric of undermining legitimacy and
even punishment for the Kurdish guests who disobeyed the rules of being hosted.316
Moreover, the dependency network that the Kurds had used for decades to promote
allegiance to it as master in hospitality relationships also caught up with the time and
Baghdad had to reconcile its financial obligation as it planned for the coming year. The
network was unsustainable and, as it was largely undergirded by petroleum export revenue,
the government in Arbīl had built up a legacy of a massive USD$772 million obligation for
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salaries. Arbīl listed 1.25 million people on salary, and of that total, 455,000 were police and
civil servants and a quarter million were KRG Peshmerga and state security (Asayish),
leaving about 525,000 on the list as undisclosed.317 With a 2017 estimated Kurdish
population at around 6.65 million, even the published number represented, by the time of the
referendum, that close to a fifth of all Kurds were on some level of permanent government
payroll.318 In negotiations with the troubled KRG, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi offered for
Baghdad to shoulder and appropriate the responsibility.319
The pattern of paternal dependence and reciprocal allegiance had traces as far back as
the Kurdish tribal emirates, to the dismay of Kurds was reinforced particularly through
Ṣaddām’s Ba’ath era, but then became a tool for the KRG itself used to project influence,
particularly in disputed areas. However, out of the collapse of the longstanding protective
narrative of Kurdish hosting emerged the of imagery of abandonment for all Kurds, a feeling
that Yezidis have well known.320 Kurds and Yezidis alike are now together facing the
restructuring of borders and ideas of the home around them.
However, divisions still exist in the Yezidi community toward future prospects and
ideas of home, especially between the opinions of Yezidis in KRG-dominated areas and
Sinjaris. Before the referendum, an International Organization for Migration (IOM) study
interviewed both IDPs from and people who had already returned to (returnees) Sinjar
City:321 Unsurprisingly, insecurity was cited as the primary reason among IDPs originally
from Sinjar for not returning to the area and about half said that the area in which they are
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currently displaced and hosted is safer.322 However, more importantly, the report remarked
that “There is no consensus among interviewed IDPs and returnees about which actor is the
most appropriate to foster cohesion in Markaz Sinjar.”323 Half of IDPs listed the KRG as the
“preferred actor” with tribal leaders (39%) and religious leaders (30%) scoring second and
third, respectively and the GoI scored second to last among IDPs, with only 21%.324
However, among returnees surveyed, like Yezidis actually living in Sinjar, the KRG scored
only 26% and, while still outpacing the GoI at 12%, 61% of people surveyed nevertheless
preferred an international actor.325 IDPs, like Yezidis hosted in camps, largely reported broad
support, either somewhat or very satisfied with the KRG, Peshmerga, and Asayish (KRG
state security), with over 90% in each category.326 However, over half of returnees were
either neutral or unsupportive of the same three.327 A majority of IDPs were unsatisfied with
militias, while an overwhelming majority of returnees were either neutral or actually
supportive of them.328
Despite the same host in both cases, the respective experiences of Yezidi IDPs shown
hospitality by the KRG in camps mostly in the Duhok area differed significantly to the
experiences of Yezidi returnees in Sinjar. IDPs, who were also from Sinjar and experienced
the same atrocities, generally looked more favorably on their Kurdish hosts, testifying to the
relative effectiveness of the KRG co-opting and appropriating inclusive rhetoric and policies.
Meanwhile, Yezidis in Sinjar were more skeptical of the KRG’s narrative and rhetoric, and
over the three years between the ISIS assault and the central Iraqi re-takeover of Sinjar, had
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more direct experience of how the same nationalist focus actually manifested in a disputed
area.
Yezidi returnees in Sinjar tended to look much more favorably, or at least did not
have the same negative perceptions, toward militias like the PKK and all-Yezidi YBS. The
repeated efforts of the KRG and the Kurdish media to present the PKK and its affiliate
militias as the source of instability and a lack of returns for hosted Yezidi IDPs in camps
appears to have had a collective effect on galvanizing support for the KRG among Yezidi
IDPs in camps as legitimate. At the same time, the same rhetoric seemed to spawn an
alternative Yezidi narrative in Sinjar and pushed the rhetoric outside of the binaries. Yezidi
returnees embraced a now popular sentiment of preferring to trust an international actor.
Furthermore, even since 2003, issues like land tenure challenges that found their roots
in Ba’athist Arabization, collectivization, and control policies still continue to haunt Yezidis.
In Sinjar, the lack of access to titles and deeds still remains a prohibitive barrier for returns.
Ongoing territorial disputes, like those outlined in Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution have
not only not been effectively resolved, but rather made worse by the different governments
and actors repeatedly co-opting the Yezidi area into larger nationalistic disputes, effectively
tabling smaller issues like land re-acquisition and compensation schemes.329 Yezidi returns to
Sinjar also remain affected by an unprecedented schism that developed between ethnic Arabs
and the minority community. As early as 2015, not long after mass grave sites had been
discovered, returning Yezidis were accused of taking revenge and killing 21 people from
Arab tribes in the village of Sibaya near Sinjar.330
While the KRG’s conditional hospitality clearly proved to be problematic to the
Yezidi community, the future prospect of the same methodology in the hands of the central

329

UN HABITAT. Emerging Land Tenure Issues.
Coles, Isabel. "Iraqi Yazidis Take Revenge as Islamic State Atrocities
Unearthed."Reuters, February 10, 2015.
330

103

Iraqi government does not provide superior prospects. Tendencies and mechanisms toward
co-option are still in place and Yezidis remain as a hosted minority group that is often
absorbed into larger affairs. Still concludes that considering the philosophical idea of
hospitality can, instead of giving place to rest, “interrupt what might otherwise petrify into
fixed political (op)positions.”331 The paradoxes and tension inherent in hospitality prompt
decision precisely because they do not allow rest in oversimplified binaries.
Conclusion
[…] for deconstruction is a relentless, if sometimes indirect, discourse on
democracy, on a democracy to come. Derrida’s democracy is a radically pluralistic
polity that resists the terror of an organic, ethnic, spiritual, communitarian unity, of
the natural, native bonds of the nation- (natus, natio) state, which grind to dust
everything that is not kin of the ruling kind and genus (Geschlecht). He dreams of
a nation without nationalistic or nativistic closure, of a community without
identity. His is a nonidentical community that cannot say “I” or “we,” a “we” that
is not constituted by its fortification against, but by its invention of, the other.332
Yezidis were first named as foreigners and others as far back as the 1100s and, over
time, the group’s distancing progressively established them as subjects of disproportionate
relationships of power. Those relationships led to persecutions and also provided
opportunities for majority actors to co-opt Yezidis into larger interests, further harming the
community’s self-determination. The 2014 ISIS attack on the community pushed the
historical patterns to a breaking point, culminating in the largest physical population shift that
Yezidis have ever faced and an equally unprecedented relationship of hospitality that created
a platform for wholesale appropriation into Kurdish ethno-nationalism and territorial
expansion.
For a majority of the community, and for a majority of displaced Yezidis, continued
presence in the Kurdistan Region is still the likeliest prospect for a durable solution. For
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many Yezidis, it has been home for some time, but for nearly a quarter million, tents have
become the new norm. However, the momentum toward Kurdish nationalism has waned and
the future of the agenda into which Yezidis have been co-opted is uncertain. Even if
displaced Yezidis are given the opportunity to return home, they continue to face barriers as
central Iraqi forces now control Sinjar.
Oversimplified binaries like host and guest, Iraqi and Kurd, foreign and family, and
home and away, are blurred and do not adequately capture the challenges that Yezidis face in
this unprecedented forced displacement. For many, in the tension between the dialectics,
other emerging options are promoted, like the creation of a Yezidi homeland, or a shift
toward international protection. However, like Derrida’s concepts of cosmopolitan cities of
refuge, the prospects for these alternatives seems to remain slim. Instead Yezidi forced
migrants continue to face other actors and interests who drift toward a tendency to reduce and
co-opt their situation.
Engaging Derrida’s deconstruction of hospitality and foreignness combats that
tendency. It shows that the Yezidi situation cannot be understood through oversimplified
dichotomies and that doing so is harmful to the community, especially in light of trauma,
memory, future threats of co-option, and the prospects for one day returning home. As
Kurdish nationalism shifts, a new threshold for hospitality will eventually emerge, and the
form it will take is as yet unknown. However, clear patterns have shown that it will invariably
involve reductions and appropriation. Instead, there remains a need to critically engage the
future Yezidi situation from a deconstructive standpoint of holding them as guests in tension.
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Photograph 1: A sketch of the Lalish Valley and tomb of Shaykh ‘Adi. Yezidis consider the temple complex their holiest site and have attempted seek refuge in the secluded foothills for
hundreds of years, though it has been repeatedly sacked and desecrated. From: Newman, John P. The Thrones and Palaces of Babylon and Nineveh - From Sea to Sea - A Thousand Miles on
Horseback. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1876, p. 398.

Photograph 2: A sketch of the “Chief of the Devil-Worshipers.” From: Newman, John P.
The Thrones and Palaces of Babylon and Nineveh - From Sea to Sea - A Thousand Miles
on Horseback. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1876, p. 400

Photograph 3: A sketch of the “High-Priest of the Devil-Worshipers.” From: Newman,
John P. The Thrones and Palaces of Babylon and Nineveh - From Sea to Sea - A Thousand
Miles on Horseback. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1876, p. 403

Photograph 4: A sketch of one of the Sanjak. The Sanjak are brass standards that Yezidis regard as representative of their deity, Melek Tawus, the Peacock Angel. They are rarely, if ever,
seen by outsiders, but used by Yezidi religious Qawwals as they travel around to collect alms. From: Badger, George Percy, (Reverend). The Nestorians and Their Rituals: With the Narrative
of a Mission to Mesopotamia and Coordistan in 1842-1844, and of a Late Visit to Those Countries in 1850; Also, Researches into the Present Condition of the Syrian Jacobites, Papal Syrians,
and Chaldeans, and an Inquiry into the Religious Tenets of the Yezeedees. Vol. 1. London: Joseph Masters, 1852, p. 124.

Photograph 5: A lithograph plate depicting the main door to the Yezidi temple and place of pilgrimage in Lalish which is also the tomb of the venerated Shaykh ‘Adi. Note the prominent
black snake to the right of the door among several other symbols. The colors around the door have since faded and eroded, but the black snake is still visible when visiting the shrine today.
From: Ussher, John. A Journey from London to Persepolis – Including Wanderings in Daghestan, Georgia, Armenia, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Persia. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1865,
insert between pp. 408 and 409

Photograph 6: A mural painted in 2016 in the Lalish Temple Complex near Shaykh ‘Adi’s tomb depicting the syncretic Yezidi tradition of Noah’s ark in the flood. The Yezidi version of the
story includes that a hole was punctured in the ark by the tallest peak of Mount Sinjar, but it was saved when the revered black snake used its body to plug the leak. Yezidis also believe that
the ark was built (or at one point stopped) in the village of ‘Ain Sifni (Shaykhan), which is about 10 km south of Lalish and came to rest on Mount Judie, the location of which is disputed.
Note also the two distinctly conical Yezidi temples on a mountain (dry land) in the background and the dove carrying the sign of land and safety in its claws. Photograph: Author. cf: Nicolaus,
Peter. "The Serpent Symbolism in the Yezidi Religious Tradition and the Snake in Yerevan." Iran & the Caucasus 15, no. 1/2 (2011): 49-72, pp. 52 & 54; Parry, Oswald H. Six Months in a
Syrian Monastery, Being a Record of a Visit to the Head Quarters of the Syrian Church in Mesopotamia, with Some Account of the Yazidis, or Devil Worshippers of Mosul and El Jilwah,
Their Sacred Book. London: Horace Cox, 1895, p. 381; and Guest, John S. Survival among the Kurds: a History of the Yezidis. Kegan Paul International, 1993, p. 31

Photograph 7: Destroyed buildings and infrastructure line the streets of a commercial district in Sinjar City, Nineveh, Iraq. It was Captured by ISIS in August 2014 and held until November
2015 when it was retaken by an alliance of KRG Peshmerga, PKK, YPG, and YBS forces, with support from coalition airstrikes. Over the course of more than a year of occupation, ISIS forces
constructed a network of tunnels that were used to avoid repeated airstrikes. However, much of the city now lies in ruin. Estimates for the number of families that have returned post-liberation
range from 500-1000 (approx. 4,500 individuals), but the city is mostly unoccupied other than by armed militias, security forces, and political actors. As recently as April 2017, the city was
still within 5 km of the ISIS front lines before the territory was recaptured by al-Ḥashd al-Sha’aby militias. In October 2017, ISF regained control of the entire Sinjar area from the KRG.

Photograph 8: An ISIS flag is painted over the window of a house in the town of Snuny,
north of Sinjar Mountain. The house was reportedly the ISIS headquarters in Snuny during
its occupation. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 10: Graffiti marked by ISIS on a home in the town of Snuny. (It is the Islamic
Takbīr, saying, in Arabic, Allahu akbar ()ﷲ أﻛﺒﺮ, or “God is [the] greatest.”) Photograph:
Author.

Photograph 9: An ISIS flag and graffiti are painted on the side of a house in the town of
Snuny. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 11: Part of a tunnel network dug by ISIS to avoid airstrikes leads under a
house in Sinjar City. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 12: A human jaw bone, teeth, and other remains sit above a reported mass grave found in Sinjar City next to the road that leads up Sinjar Mountain. Within two months of the
liberation of Sinjar, 35 mass grave sites, including the one photographed, were discovered in and around towns and villages that were recaptured. Some of the remains have only become
visible as rain and weather have eroded the shallow level of soil that was hastily used to cover the sites after executions. Photograph: Author. See: Yazda. “Suspected Mass Grave Sites of
Yazidis in the Sinjar Area.” Yazda Documentation Project, 28 Jan. 2016.

Photograph 13: A billboard in Snuny town shows Abdullah Öcalan, a Kurdish nationalist
figurehead and one of the founders of the PKK, in front of the group’s flag, and
overshadows another billboard depicting Yezidis practicing a religious rite at Yezidi
temples. Öcalan is now serving a life sentence in prison in Turkey for treason (commuted
from a death-sentence as a part of Turkey’s bid to join the EU). Photograph: Author

Photograph 15: The flags of the HPG and YJA STAR fly to the left and right,
respectively, of a flag depicting the PKK and Kurdish nationalist leader Abdullah Öcalan
on a building or converted house in the Sinjar City area. Photograph: Author

Photograph 14: A permanent monument on top of Mount Sinjar shows a photo of Masoud
Barzani, the President of the Iraqi KRG and leader of the PDK/KDP, giving a press
conference in the same location where he announced the recapturing of Sinjar by KRG
Peshmerga forces. The monument is enshrined by KRG and PDK flags. Sinjar City is
visible at the base of the mountain. Photograph: Author

Photograph 16: A makeshift, but unoccupied HPG / YBS checkpoint is set up in an
equally empty Sinjar City. The new checkpoint owners have painted over its old ISIS flag
and have added YBS graffiti tags on buildings in the background. Photograph: Author

Photograph 17: Checkpoint personnel in the Sinjar area wear Iraqi Federal Police uniforms under the authority of the Ministry of
Interior in Baghdad (note the Iraqi, not KRG, flags on the uniforms) but guard a checkpoint that flies a Kurdish flag. Sinjar is in
the Nineveh Governorate with its provincial capital in Mosul and has been controlled by the KRG, ISIS, and is now back under
central Iraqi administration. These officers are Kurdish or Yezidi locals, not Arabs, but still receive salaries from Baghdad despite
at the time being in defacto Kurdish-controlled territory and themselves being ethnic Kurds. Photograph: Author

Photograph 18: A large, prominent KRG flag flies over the offices of the Barzani Charity
Foundation providing food and non-food items (NFI) to displaced Yezidis on top of Sinjar
Mountain. Smaller Iraqi and Yezidi flags fly next to the road. Photograph: Author

Photograph 19: KRG and PDK/KDP flags fly over displacement shelters, tents, and
security and telecoms infrastructure on top of Sinjar Mountain. Photograph: Author

Photograph 20: A faded, sun-bleached picture of PKK and Kurdish nationalist hero
Abdullah Öcalan sits near a group of displaced persons’ tents on top of Sinjar Mountain. It
is covered with graffiti tags that say PKK and “Apo,” a Kurdish term of endearment for
Öcalan, shorthand for Abdullah or meaning uncle. Photograph: Author

Photograph 21: From left to right, YPG, PKK, and YJA STAR flags fly over a fort and
radio tower installation atop Sinjar Mountain. This facility was hit by a Turkish airstrike in
the early hours of 25 April 2017 as part of a renewed effort from Ankara against the PKK.
Photograph: Author

Photograph 22: The winding road that leads up Sinjar Mountain from Sinjar City is lined
with rusting, abandoned cars like these that were left during the flight from ISIS to the
safety of the mountain. Photograph: Author

Photograph 23: HPG, YBS, PKK, YJA STAR, and other graffiti tags line a wall in Sinjar
City. APO is Kurdish shorthand for Abdullah or uncle and is a reference to the Kurdish
nationalist leader and founder of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. Photograph: Author

Photograph 24: Large, prominent flags for the Ezidikhan (land of the Yezidis) Joint
Command for Liberating Sinjar (also known as the Sinjar Alliance) over a damaged,
abandoned commercial space in Sinjar City. Photograph: Author

Photograph 25: Forces associated with a Yezidi militia commander next to their technical
on top of Sinjar Mountain. Photograph: Author

Photograph 26: The Sinjar Mountain range viewed from the north, near the town of Snuny. Photograph: Author

Photograph 27: PKK affiliate flags, including those of the Yezidi groups YBS and YJE
(an all-female Yezidi unit) fly over a makeshift headquarters. This building was destroyed
by a Turkish airstrike in the early hours of 25 April 2017 (see Photograph 28, right)
Photograph: Author

Photograph 28: The rubble of the PKK, YBS, and YJE makeshift headquarters (see
Photograph 27, left) (viewed from the NW) after being hit by a Turkish airstrike in the
early hours of 25 April 2017. The Sinjar Mountains are visible in the background.
Photograph: Author

Photograph 29: The view from within the Sinjar Mountains looking northwest toward the
mountain-pass village of Karsy, which serves as a gateway to the only road. The valley is
lined by terraced farms, some growing tobacco, and now houses several hundred displaced
persons’ tents for families that have returned to the area. Photograph: Author

Photograph 30: A re-opened store in the town of Snuny now named after Nadia Murad
(pictured on the store sign), a Yezidi girl who was kidnapped by ISIS and who gained an
international platform speaking about her ordeal. Nadia is a hero to many in the Yezidi
community and was made a UN Goodwill Ambassador by the Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) in 2016. Photograph: Author

Photograph 31: A Kurdish (KRG / KR-I) and a PDK / KDP political flag fly over a gathering place in an internally displaced persons (IDP) settlement on top of Sinjar Mountain, near the
village of Sardashde in February 2017. The gathering place also shows pictures of KRG President Masoud Barzani, one of which is with his father, the Kurdish nationalist leader Mustafa
Barzani. On the hill in the distance, a water tank is painted with the Iraqi flag and another Iraqi flag flies over a building painted with the Yezidi sun flag. The yellow taxi with the red license
plate, meaning it is from Mosul, is also of note. It and its driver are likely also displaced by the ISIS occupation of the city. Many of the Yezidis who have found shelter in IDP settlements like
the one pictured are also returnees or have been re-displaced from other areas around Sinjar where they had previously attempted to return. Renewed fighting and clashes between the PKK and
the KRG, the PKK and Turkey, and the KRG and central Iraqi Security Forces have re-displaced hundreds of families, some of whom have continued to see the mythical and literal Mountain
as a place of refuge. On 25 April 2017, Turkey conducted airstrikes against the PKK and its affiliates on top of Sinjar Mountain itself (See Photographs 27 & 28). Photograph: Author

Photograph 32: Yezidi children play at their family’s tent in the Khanke Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp in Duhok Governorate, Kurdistan Region, Iraq. The official Khanke camp
houses approximately 16,500 individual Yezidi IDPs, most of whom are from Sinjar. An additional 20,000 Yezidi IDPs live in informal settlements and tents outside the camp (Population
statistics: Duhok Board for Relief and Humanitarian Affairs, BRHA). The camp is located next to Khanke village, which was a Yezidi village before the 2014 displacement and before the
construction of the camp. Temperatures range from below 0°C in the winter to above 50°C in the summer. Lake Mosul (formed from the Mosul Dam blocking the Tigris river) is visible in the
background.
Khanke village is one of many artificial mujamma’at created during Ṣaddām Ḥusayn’s Ba’ath Party’s Arabization and collectivization policies. Many of the Yezidi families who live in the
collective town used to live in villages along the Tigris river before the creation of the dam between 1980 and 1985. When the dam was constructed (and named the Ṣaddām Dam), it created
Lake Ṣaddām and effectively forcibly displaced the populations in the riverbank villages. The Mosul Dam, and Lake Mosul, as they are now respectively called, were a major point of concern
during the 2014 ISIS offensive with fears of the dam’s inadequate engineering and construction leading some to speculate that it could collapse and flood the Mosul plain, threatening the lives
of more than half a million people. Photograph: Author

Photograph 33: Tents line the street of Kabarto 1 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp in Duhok Governorate, Kurdistan Region, Iraq. Kabarto 1 and its sister camp, Kabarto 2 (visible in
the background), together house 21,700 individual Yezidi IDPs (Population statistics: Duhok Board for Relief and Humanitarian Affairs, BRHA). Photograph: Author

Photograph 34: Essian Yezidi Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp, Nineveh Governorate, Iraq. Essian is home to 14,700 individual Yezidi IDPs and is situated close to Shaykhan and
the Lalish Temple Complex (Population statistics: Duhok Board for Relief and Humanitarian Affairs, BRHA). Yezidis consider Lalish their holiest place and it sees hundreds of thousands of
Yezidi pilgrims every year. Essian, like some other Yezidi IDP camps, is located legally in Nineveh Governorate, the capital of which is Mosul. However, it is a part of an area of disputed
territories and is defacto controlled by the KRG. Photograph: Author

Photograph 35: A very large, prominent KRG flag flies at the entrance of the only road
leading to Khanke village. The flag, a new addition after the construction of Khanke Camp,
flies over and in front of informal IDP settlements in the village. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 36: Pro-KRG independence referendum campaign posters from private
companies and universities displayed on public works in Duhok City. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 37: Pro-KRG independence referendum campaign poster from a private
company displayed on public works in Duhok City. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 38: Pro-KRG independence referendum campaign poster from a private
company displayed at a major mall in Duhok City. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 39: An ISIS flag painted on a wall in the town of Snuny accompanied by ISIS graffiti in Arabic. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 40: A camp for Yezidi IDPs in Sharf al-Dīn, on the northeast slopes of the Sinjar Mountains. This village was never captured by ISIS, but was instead defended by the local
militia leaders (and local folk heroes) Qassem Shesho and his nephew Haider Shesho. Both are notably members of the Yezidi diaspora, living regularly in Germany, and upon hearing of the
ISIS attack in Sinjar, traveled back to take up arms. After defending the area, the two gained loyal followings of Yezidi fighters and civilians alike (Haider has become a popular name) and
hosted displaced Yezidis in a new camp they founded in the village they control. The village of Sharf al-Dīn is also named after a similar Yezidi hero figure from the 1200s who was credited
with bringing Yezidism to the Mountain. The camp is home to IDPs as well as re-displaced people from PKK/KRG conflict, those that found their homes destroyed, and those who lost
property ownership rights. For a brief time in the Spring, Sinjar and most of Kurdistan become lusciously green, crops grow quickly, and shepherds have an abundance of food for their flocks.
Photograph: Author.

Photograph 41: A new school set up by the Kurdish Government (with a prominent KRG flag flying) in Nineveh Governorate. The Sinjar Mountains are visible in the background to the
south. This is a very rural village with most families being farmers, agriculturalists, and shepherds. Not many people have returned and the school, while new, was not in use at the time of the
photo. In disputed territories like the Sinjar area, the issue of education, and particularly the language in which education is given (either Arabic or Kurdish), is a hot point of contention over
power projection, control, and thresholds. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 42: PUK flags and graffiti mark an abandoned bunker unit amid the rubble of
Sinjar City. The PUK is the second major political party in the KR-I, though a minority,
and is mostly active in the areas around Sulaymāniyyah. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 43: YBS graffiti is painted over PKK graffiti which is sprayed over ISIS
graffiti on a damaged building in Sinjar City. Photograph: Author.

Photograph 44: A spray-painted ISIS flag, which includes the Islamic Shahādah, or
“testimony” that is a confession of faith, marks the roof of a Yezidi house in Snuny town.
Photograph: Author.

Photograph 45: Basic attempts paint over an ISIS graffiti flag on a house in Snuny town.
Photograph: Author.

Photograph 46: Hundreds of bullet holes riddle burned and ransacked shops in a commercial district in Sinjar City. Photograph: Author

Photograph 47: PKK and YPG affiliate flags fly at an outdoor football stadium near Sinjar City at the base of the Sinjar Mountains. Testimonies and local reports indicated that this was
the site of mass executions during the ISIS occupation of the city. Bullet holes are visible on the inside of the far wall. Photograph: Author

